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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

BRIXEN & CHRISTOPHER
ARCHITECTS, P.C. a Utah
Professional Corporation
Petitioner and Appellee,

])

vs.

]

STATE OF UTAH,

])

Respondent and Appellant.

Case No. 20000318-CA

Priority No. 15

]

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
The State appeals from a district court decision granting a petition and dismissing
a civil investigative demand issued to Appellee by the Attorney General in the course of
an antitrust investigation.
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996).
ISSUE PRESENTED, STANDARD OF REVIEW, and PRESERVATION
Is the Attorney General's objective evidence of an antitrust violation
sufficient to enforce a civil investigative demand without showing that the CID
recipient is violating the law and without being required to disclose confidential
details of the investigation?

The appellate court "will review the district court's decision for correctness while
affording a 'measure of discretion' to that court in [its] application of the correctness
standard to a given set of facts." Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 177, 179 (Utah 1998) (citing
State v. Hodson, 907 P.2d 1155, 1157 (Utah 1995); State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939
(Utah 1994); State v. Poole, 871 P.2d 531, 533 (Utah 1994)).
The issue was preserved below {see R. 73-7'4; addendum E).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Resolution of this case involves interpretation of the following statutes, whose
texts are reproduced in addendum A:
15U.S.C.A. §§ 1-2(1997)
15U.S.C.A. §57b-2(f)(1997)
UTAH CONST, art. XII, § 20

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 63-2-201 (5)(a) (1997)
§ 63-2-304 (4), (9), (16), & (17) (1997)
§76-10-912 (1999)
§76-10-914 (1999)
§ 76-10-917 (1), (2), (7), & (8) (1999)

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-10-920 (l)(a) (1999)

UTAH CODE ANN.
UTAH CODE ANN.
UTAH CODE ANN.
UTAH CODE ANN.

STATEMENT OF FACTS/STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Brixen & Christopher Architects, P.C. is one of many architectural firms assisting
Utah public entities in constructing public buildings (R. 27-28,40,42; 84:24).' The

1

The transcript of the March 16, 2000 hearing before Judge Lewis is noted in the
record as page 84, but only the cover page is included in the index. Citations to the
hearing transcript will use the record page - 84 - and the numbers of the pages being cited
in the transcript, e.g., 84:19.
2

duties of architects employed by public entities include writing specifications for door
hardware to be installed in buildings being constructed (R. 32-33; 84:19, 30-32).
The Attorney General began investigating a bid-rigging scheme based on
allegations that door hardware specifications for public buildings being submitted by
architects were written to favor the products of a particular manufacturer and sometimes
required contractors to purchase door hardware only from certain high-margin distributors
of that manufacturer (R. 23-25, 31, 35-39; 84:7, 19, 30, 32).
Many Utah architects drafting door hardware specifications for public buildings
utilize specification-writing services provided free by representatives of this manufacturer
(who is one of the nation's largest door hardware manufacturers). Those specifications
generally favor or require the use of only this manufacturer's products (R. 34; 84:19-20,
24-26, 32-34).
Brand-specific requirements placed in bid specifications ("no-substitution" bids)
preclude the use of products from other manufacturers. When favorable "no-substitution"
specifications are inserted into bids, this manufacturer raises the wholesale prices to its
distributors to levels higher than on projects where bids are open to products from other
manufacturers (R. 23, 35-39; 84:19, 20-21, 24, 26).
In many cases, owners of the public buildings did not request, or even know of, bid
restrictions (inserted by the architects) limiting which manufacturer's products could be
used on a project or which distributors had to supply the products (R. 23, 33, 35; 84:7,

3

25). Architects working on state buildings are contractually required to get permission
from the Utah Division of Facilities, Construction and Management (DFCM) before
using any consultants to assist in preparing specifications and are expressly prohibited
from using "sales" consultants affiliated with vendors (R. 58; 84:23-24).
In the early part of its investigation, the Attorney General sent a letter to a number
of architectural firms, including Brixen, in June 1999 asking for information about how
Utah architects prepare door hardware specifications (R. 28, 40; 84:36). None of the
firms receiving the letter responded or provided any information (R. 28, 40; 84:36). The
Attorney General continued to gather information informally, interviewing the
manufacturer's specification writers and distributors, school district officials, DFCM
representatives, and architects (R. 27, 331-32, 84:13, 20-21, 31-33).
In November 1999, civil investigative demands (CIDs) were issued to two Utah
architectural firms. Information showing how these two firms used specification-writing
consultants was analyzed and bidding documents they prepared were reviewed (R. 23, 32,
84:13-14, 34-35). Additional CIDs were issued to 19 architectural firms in January 2000.
These CIDs contained seven interrogatories designed to determine the extent to which
these architects used manufacturers^ free specification-writing services when designing
public buildings (R. 1, 4-9; 84:13, 35; addendum B). All the architectural firms
responded to the CIDs, except Brixen (R. 28; 84:35).
Brixen & Christopher Architects filed a petition on January 25, 2000 to set aside

4

the investigative demand (R. 1-3). After briefing by the parties and submission of
affidavits (addendum C), a hearing was held before District Court Judge Leslie A. Lewis
on March 16, 2000 (R. 72, 84:1-45; addendum D).
The trial court agreed with the arguments made by Brixen in its memorandum and
oral argument and signed a three-paragraph written order on March 28, 2000 granting the
petition and dismissing the CID (R. 73-74; addendum E). Although the court did not
explain the basis for its decision, the reasons can be gleaned from statements made by
Judge Lewis during oral argument. It appears that the CID was dismissed (quashed)
because the court concluded that the State: a) was required to demonstrate that the CID
recipient was violating the law (R. 84:13, 14, 17, 26, 34); b) should not have notified
Brixen that it was a target (R. 84:9-12, 35, 37-38, 43); c) should identify the sources of its
information (R. 84:7-8, 13, 14, 31, 35); and d) demonstrated insufficient reasonable cause
(R. 84:24, 38, 42-43).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
When a petitioner contests the issuance of an antitrust civil investigative demand
(CID), the Attorney General must demonstrate to a trial court that the State's belief that a
violation is occurring is a reasonable belief and must put forth some evidence in support
of that belief. If this "reasonable cause" exists, the Attorney General is entitled to seek
information from any party possessing relevant information.
The trial court improperly imposed additional requirements on the State at the

5

hearing on Appellee's challenge to the investigative demand. The State should not be
required to demonstrate illegal conduct by a recipient of a CID and should not be obliged
to disclose confidential details of its investigation in order to have a CID enforced.
Substantial evidence was presented to the trial court showing agreements between
a manufacturer and architects to create restrictive bid specifications that foreclosed
competitors and raised prices to public entities. With this evidence, it was reasonable for
the Attorney General to believe an illegal restraint of trade was occurring. The trial court
erred in refusing to find reasonable cause and in imposing unjustified additional
conditions on the State.
ARGUMENT
THE OBJECTIVE EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO THE TRIAL
COURT PROVIDED THE ATTORNEY GENERAL WITH
REASONABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE THAT BRIXEN &
CHRISTOPHER ARCHITECTS MAY POSSESS INFORMATION
RELEVANT TO AN ONGOING ANTITRUST INVESTIGATION OF
A CONSPIRACY RESTRAINING TRADE IN BUILDING
HARDWARE

I.

REASONABLE CAUSE TO ENFORCE AN INVESTIGATIVE
DEMAND REQUIRES ONLY A REASONED BELIEF THAT THIS
TRADE RESTRAINT IS ILLEGAL

A. Reasonable Cause
1.

The CID Statute

The Attorney General's duty to investigate antitrust violations derives from
constitutional and statutory mandates:
6

It is the policy of the state of Utah that a free market system shall govern
trade and commerce in this state to promote the dispersion of economic and
political power and the general welfare of all the people. Each contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of
trade or commerce is prohibited... .
UTAH CONST, art. XII,

§20.

The Utah Antitrust Act contains a declaration of legislative intent:
The Legislature finds and determines that competition is fundamental to the
free market system and that the unrestrained interaction of competitive
forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest
prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at the
same time providing an environment conducive to the preservation of our
democratic, political and social institutions.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§76-10-912 (1999).

If the Attorney General is investigating anticompetitive conduct, civil investigative
demands can be issued to compel the production of documents, testimony, or
interrogatory responses:
When the attorney general has reasonable cause to believe that any person
may be in possession, custody, or control of any information relevant to a
civil investigation, [s]he may, prior to the commencement of a civil action
thereon, issue and cause to be served upon that person a written civil
investigative demand.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-917 (1) (1999). This statutory grant of CID authority enables
the Attorney General to "gather[] enough information to make a proper determination as
to whether a civil antitrust action should be initiated." Evans 963 P.2d at 181.
To enforce a CID she has issued, the Attorney General must demonstrate "that
there is reasonable cause to believe that there has been a violation of this act, and that the
7

information sought or document demanded is relevant to the violation." UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-10-917 (7)(b)(ii) (1999). There are two aspects to this "reasonable cause": a
reasoned belief that a violation is occurring and some objective evidence supporting that
belief. When these elements are met, the State can seek information from anyone
possessing "relevant" information.2
2.

Evans v. State

The Utah Supreme Court has outlined the procedure a trial court should employ
when analyzing whether reasonable cause supports the Attorney General's CID:
[T]he decision is relatively uncomplicated, as it does not involve extensive
weighing or testing of evidence or any resolution of conflicts on the
evidence. The question at hearing is not whether the state's information is
true or uncontradicted, but whether, assuming its accuracy, the state has in
its possession sufficient information to satisfy a judge that it is reasonable
to believe that there has been a violation of the act.
Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 177, 182 (Utah 1998) (quoting Babbit v. Herndon, 581 P.2d 688,
692 (Ariz. 1978) (emphasis in Evans)). The court went on to contrast this "civil"
reasonable cause standard with criminal probable cause standards:
Reason dictates that an investigation based on the reasonable cause standard
requires less evidence than the "quantum of evidence sufficient to warrant
submission of the case to the trier of fact" required by the probable cause
standard. Moreover, the reasonable cause standard would seem to allow an
investigation to go forward on the assumption that the attorney general's
case will only get stronger as the investigation proceeds.

2

UTAH CODE ANN.

§76-10-917(1) (1999).

8

Evans, 963 P.2d at 182. Evidence fails to meet the reasonable cause standard "only when
it is '[w]holly lacking and incapable of reasonable inference to prove some issue which
supports the [prosecution's] claim.'" Evans, 963 P.2d at 182 (quoting State v. Pledger,
896 P.2d 1226, 1229 (Utah 1995)).
Although the Attorney General must be investigating conduct that appears
unlawful, the CIDs can be issued at a preliminary stage of the investigation:
We agree that the State must have some objective evidence that there has
been a violation of the antitrust laws. However, as previously mentioned,
the purpose of the investigative power is to aid the State in determining
whether an enforcement action should even be initiated. The higher
protections afforded by higher standards are not necessary because CIDs are
part of an investigation rather than an enforcement action.
Evans, 963 P.2d at 183.
The two-part question a trial court should answer in evaluating reasonable cause is
whether the State has a reasoned belief that an antitrust violation has occurred and can
demonstrate "some" amount of "objective evidence" supporting its belief.
B. The Illegal Conduct
7.

The "Activities Under Investigation"

When issuing a CID, the State is required to identify the suspected violation.
"Each demand shall state: (i) the nature of the activities under investigation, constituting
the alleged antitrust violation, which may result in a violation of this act and the
applicable provision of law

" UTAH CODE ANN. §76-10-917(2)(a) (1999) (emphasis

added).
9

The principal purpose of this requirement is to enable the CID recipient to
determine which documents, relevant to the investigation, should be produced. 'The test,
however, must be whether the statement in the demand as to the nature of the conduct
under investigation is sufficient to determine the relevancy of the documents demanded
for inspection." Petition of Gold Bond Stamp Co., 221 F.Supp. 391, 397 (D. Minn.
1963).
Inclusion of a statement describing the "nature of activities under investigation" is
not designed, however, to invite the CID recipient to second-guess the State's legal
theory, argue whether such conduct can be justified in some circumstances, or discover
how much evidence the State already has gathered implicating the targets. See Babbitt v.
Herndon, 581 P.2d 688, 691 (Ariz. 1978) (CID recipient not entitled to counterdiscovery
at such an early stage).
Under Utah law, inclusion of the statement describing the activities under
investigation serves a second purpose: allowing court review of the State's reasonable
cause prevents investigative abuses. Evans, 963 P.2d at 182. In doing such a review, the
trial court's role is to examine whether it is reasonable for the Attorney General to believe
there has been a violation.3

3

This inquiry is conducted in light of "the assumption that the attorney general's
case will only get stronger as the investigation proceeds." Evan, 963 P.2d at 182.
10

2.

Description of This Violation

The CID issued to Brixen cited UTAH CODE ANN. §76-10-914 (1) and (2) (1999)
as the law applicable to this investigation, then described the "activities under
investigation" as "[a] combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade in the creation of
door hardware specifications for public buildings and in the sale of door hardware for
installation in public buildings in Utah." (R. 5; addendum B).
In the face of this description, the trial court's two-part question becomes quite
specific: is it reasonable for the Attorney General to believe that there is a "conspiracy in
restraint of trade in the creation of door hardware specifications" and does the Attorney
General have "some objective evidence" to support its belief.
3.

The Illegality of this Restraint

Conspiracies in restraint of trade are prohibited by the Utah Constitution4 and by
the Utah Antitrust Act:
(1) Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce is declared to be illegal.
(2) It shall be unlawful for any person to monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons to
monopolize, any part of trade or commerce.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-10-914 (1999).5

While many trade restraints are judged under the "rule of reason," others are
4

UTAH CONST,

art. XII, §20, discussed supra.

5

These provisions are virtually identical to the federal antitrust laws found in the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-2 (1997).
11

deemed so inherently pernicious that they are adjudged "per se" illegal. State v.
Thompson, 751 P. 2d 805, 811 (Utah App. 1988). The Utah Antitrust Act categorizes
four types of conduct as per se illegal: "price fixing, bid rigging, agreeing among
competitors to divide customers or territories, or [] engaging in a group boycott with
specific intent of eliminating competition . . . . " UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-920(l)(a)
(1999).
To the extent that architects and a manufacturer agree to rig bids, create a
procedure to boycott competitors, or implement actions that have the effect of fixing
higher prices, the conduct is per se illegal.
Since the 1979 adoption of the current Utah Antitrust Act, there has been only one
reported Utah decision, besides Evans, interpreting the Act. In State v. Thompson, 751
P.2d 805 (Utah App. 1988), rev 'd on other grounds, 810 P.2d 415 (Utah 1991), a security
officer employed by Utah Power & Light was responsible for making recommendations
to UP&L management for the selection of security guard companies. On his
recommendation, the company selected an outside security guard company, without
competitive bidding. The company selected had paid money secretly to the security
officer for excluding competitors in the selection process. Id. at 807. Thompson was
charged and convicted of violating the Utah Antitrust Act and other laws.
This court affirmed Thompson's conviction holding that "[w]hen the bribery is
coupled with other acts tending to restrain trade, a claim under the Sherman Act may be

12

established." Id. (quoting Municipality of Anchorage v. Hitachi Cable, Ltd., 547 F.Supp.
633, 645 (D. Alaska 1982)). The "other acts" found by the Court of Appeals in the
Thompson case included the security officer's "refusal to accept proposals from other
security guard companies." Thompson, 751 P.2d at 811. The court found that "the
primary purpose of the bribes was to restrain trade by eliminating all competition for the
UP&L security contract." Id. Further, since "the usual course of action when selecting a
security guard company is open bidding[]," id. at 814, an intent to violate the law could
be inferred.
In the instant case, architects submitted biased specifications (foreclosing the use
of competitors' products) to public entities in exchange for free bid-drafting services
provided to the architects by this manufacturer. This foreclosure of competitors is similar
to the conduct found illegal in Thompson and justifies as reasonable the Attorney
General's belief that trade is being restrained in the creation of door hardware
specifications.
The second part of the trial court's inquiry then should be whether the Attorney
General could demonstrate "some objective evidence," Evans, 963 P.2d at 183, to support
its belief that the "activities under investigation . . . may result in a violation of this
a c t . . . . " UTAH CODE ANN. §76-10-917(2)(a)(i) (1999) (emphasis added).

13

II.

THE STATUTORILY REQUIRED "REASONABLE CAUSE"
SUPPORTING A CIVIL INVESTIGATIVE DEMAND EXISTS EVEN
IF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL LACKS EVIDENCE OF AN
ANTITRUST VIOLATION BY BRIXEN ITSELF

A. The Trial Court's Ruling
The trial court's March 28, 2000 written order did not explain its reasons for
dismissing the CID, saying only that "Plaintiffs Petition . . . is granted as prayed . . . ."
(R. 73-74; addendum E). The transcript of the reasonable cause hearing indicates,
however, that the court applied an improper test in ruling the State had not met its burden
of demonstrating evidence in support of its belief.
Judge Lewis remarked that the Attorney General's investigation lacked a necessary
"nexus" between the suspected violation and Brixen (R. 84:24) and that there was a "big
hole" in the investigation (R. 84:42; addendum E). See also R. 84:38, 42-43. These
conclusions can be reconciled with the evidence shown to the trial court only by
understanding that the trial court changed the legal standard of "reasonable cause" the
State must meet by adding requirements not found in the statute or case law.
B. Judge Lewis Required the State to Demonstrate Illegal Conduct by Brixen
Judge Lewis's refusal to enforce the CID issued to Brixen appeared to stem from a
mistaken belief that the Attorney General had a burden of demonstrating reasonable
grounds to believe that Appellee was violating the law. During the hearing, Judge Lewis
frequently pressed the Attorney General to prove that Appellee was violating the law.
"I'd like to know . . . what they stated Brixen & Christopher had done
14

" (R. 84: 13).

"I haven't heard one thing indicating whether there was any wrongdoing that would lead
you to tell them and conclude that they're a target." (R. 84:14). "[T]he government. . .
[has] the wrong .. . target." (R. 84:17) In inquiring whether the State could establish
whether Appellee itself had used specification writers, Judge Lewis inquired: "Well, have
they or have they not?" (R. 84:26). "Many architects do it [use outside specification
writers]. So why have you singled out Brixen & Christopher?" (R. 84: 34).
This is the wrong focus. The Attorney General is not limited to requesting
information only from those suspected of violating the law.6 If there is reasonable cause
to believe that someone is violating the law, the State can seek information from anyone
so long as "the information sought or document or object demanded is relevant to the
violation." UTAH CODE ANN. §76-10-917(7)(b)(ii) (1999). See also UTAH CODE ANN.
§76-10-917(1) (1999) (allowing issuance of a CID to "any person . . . in possession . . . of
any [relevant] information . . . . " ) .
The trial court seems to have been confused, believing that the State should
demonstrate misconduct by a CID recipient before the CID could be enforced.
Undoubtedly, if there were evidence that a CID recipient had committed a violation, that
evidence would be relevant to determining reasonable cause. However, the absence of

6

While in this case, Brixen & Christopher is suspected of allowing this
manufacturer to help write its bid specifications, the State does not yet have proof of that
fact. This is the type of information sought in the CID issued to Brixen. Judge Lewis
expressed her belief that the State's evidence did not show a violation by Brixen. But, a
showing of misconduct by a CID recipient is not a prerequisite to enforcing a CID.
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violation-specific conduct by a CID recipient does not disqualify the Slate from seeking
relevant information. In fact, much of the information obtained during antitrust
investigations comes from persons who are not suspected of misconduct.
The Attorney General emphasized to Judge Lewis that the test was not whether
Appellee was violating the law, but whether any person was violating the law and, if so,
whether Appellee had information relevant to the violations being investigated (R. 84:9,
29-30). Nevertheless, in requiring the State to establish that Appellee had violated the
law, instead of simply establishing that Appellee had information relevant to a violation
by the door hardware manufacturer, Judge Lewis applied an improper test.
C. The Trial Court Objected to the State's "Target" Notice
The CID issued to Appellee contained disclosures and warnings required by UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-10-917(2) (1999). Additionally, the CID put Appellee on notice that in
responding to the CID, Appellee should consider itself a target. This notice troubled the
trial court and appeared to contribute to the court's determination to dismiss the CID.
(See R. 84:9-12, 35, 37-38, 43).
Assuming that the State is not limited to obtaining information only from those
against whom it already can demonstrate a likelihood of violation, then some of those
from whom the State seeks information will be innocent third parties (such as banks,
competitors, customers, suppliers, etc.). Other CID recipients may be at risk of being
named as defendants. In either case, the entities are obliged to produce the requested

16

information. Entities that may end up as defendants still are required to provide
information because one of the important purposes of the CID information-gathering
process is to determine who has engaged in the unlawful conduct: "Likewise, the CIDs
issued by the Utah Attorney General assist that agency in gathering enough information to
make a proper determination as to whether a civil antitrust action should be initiated."
Evans, 963 P.26 at m.
A business that has engaged in acts being investigated as anticompetitive risks
being named as a defendant in an enforcement action. Because the State was seeking
information from a company (Brixen) suspected of submitting specifications written by
this manufacturer's representatives, the CID advised Brixen that it should consider itself a
target when responding to the CID (R. 5). To the extent that this "target" notice was used
by the trial court in evaluating whether the evidence at hand constituted reasonable cause
or added to the trial court's resolve to dismiss the CID, that influence was erroneous.

III. WHEN EVALUATING "REASONABLE CAUSE," A TRIAL COURT
SHOULD NOT REQUIRE THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO
DISCLOSE THE IDENTITY OF CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES OR
THE DETAILS OF INFORMATION GIVEN TO THE
INVESTIGATOR, NOR SHOULD THE TRIAL COURT EVALUATE
THE CREDIBILITY OF THE INFORMATION RELIED ON BY
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
A. The Trial Court Improperly Demanded Disclosure of Confidential Information
At the March 16, 2000 reasonable cause hearing, Judge Lewis insisted it was not
enough for the investigator to describe his findings: he was expected to identify the
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people to whom he had spoken and describe what each had said; the trial court wanted
disclosure of confidential sources. Examples of the court's comments include:
•

"Well who? Do you have the name of a witness? Is there an affidavit?"
(R. 84:7-8).

•

"I'd like to know who stated to you that Brixen & Christopher was involved
and what they stated Brixen & Christopher had done that caused you to
conclude that they had engaged in this conduct." (R. 84:13).

•

"They've just told you - - they being an unidentified group of people. You
still haven't given me any names." (R. 84:13).

•

"What I'm interested in, sir, is specifics. Who told you what that led you to
these concerns[?] . . . And I'm going to know - - want to know exactly
what they said about the plaintiff in this action." (R. 84:14).

•

"And what information, if any, do you have that that occurred in this
case[?]" . . . [An explanation followed that information had come from
DFCM and school districts.] "No, that's not a person. You're saying the
school talked to you[?] Who at the school?" (R. 84:31).
"Who were they?" (R. 84:35).

B. Investigative Information Should be Confidential
Under the Utah Antitrust Act, investigations are confidential until a public
enforcement action is initiated. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-917(8) (1999). The policy
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reasons for this are readily apparent. As the supreme court noted in Evans, the Attorney
General's goal is to determine whether there has been a violation of the antitrust laws.
Evans, 963 P.2d at 183. Consequently, until the extent of a violation has been determined
and it has been decided that an enforcement action is warranted, the existence of the
investigation, the identity of the persons being investigated, and the identity of the
persons who have been interviewed should remain confidential.7
Indeed, the State is statutorily precluded from disclosing the sources of certain
information. To the extent that the State's information derived from CIDs issued earlier
to two other architectural firms, the Attorney General is prohibited from disclosing the
sources of that information. "Any procedure, testimony taken, or material produced
under this section shall be kept confidential by the attorney general unless confidentiality
is waived in writing by the person who has testified, or produced documents or objects."
UTAH CODE ANN.

§76-10-917 (8)(a) (1999). Similarly, investigative information is

exempt from Utah public records law, whether obtained through compulsory process or
provided voluntarily. UTAH CODE ANN. §§63-2-201 (5)(a); 63-2-304 (4), (9), (16), and

7

Some disclosure will always occur. The very fact that a recipient of a CID files a
petition in district court to quash the CID discloses the existence of an investigation and
the identity of that recipient. Also, in demonstrating the reasonable cause basis for the
investigation, the State is required to disclose "objective evidence" regarding the basis for
its investigation. Evans, 963 P.2d at 183. However, that should not mean that the State is
required to identify each person from whom it has obtained information.
19

(17) (1997).8
The State explained to Judge Lewis its desire not to disclose confidential
information: "Part of the concern is that we are reluctant - - or concerned about
publicizing the components of an investigation that we are still hoping to maintain
confidential." (R. 84:15-16; see 84:21).9
This desire to keep the investigation confidential is grounded on three important
principles. First, the recipient of a CID should not be entitled to use the petition process
to discover how much information the State already knows and then use that knowledge
to fashion, or limit, its response to the CID.10 Second, other persons being investigated
8

Federal law imposes the same restriction:

Any material which is received by the [Federal Trade] Commission in any
investigation, a purpose of which is to determine whether any person may
have violated any provision of the laws administered by the Commission,
and which is provided pursuant to any compulsory process under this Act,
or which is provided voluntarily in place of such compulsory process shall
be exempt from disclosure under [the Freedom of Information Act].
15 U.S.C.A. §57b-2(f) (1997) (emphasis added). See National Education Ass'n v. FTC,
1983-2 Trade Cas. ^65,654 (D. Mass. 1983).
9

In Evans, the supreme court acknowledged the practice of having an Attorney
General's investigator describe his findings (including the fact that a customer had
complained) in an affidavit. The complaining merchant in that case was never identified
in any court proceedings. See 963 P.2d at 178-79, 183.
10

A CID recipient is not entitled to discovery from the State in preparing his
defense. "To permit counterdiscovery at such an early stage in the enforcement
proceedings would serve only to unduly hamper and delay the Attorney General's duty to
investigate possible fraudulent practices." Babbitt v. Herndon, 581 P.2d 688, 691 (Ariz.
1978).
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should not be able to take advantage of a CID challenge in order to discover that they are
being investigated and the precise nature of the investigation. The fear here is that
records may not be preserved or the investigation will be much more difficult if the
violator knows the focus of the investigation. Third, the persons being investigated, and
those being interviewed, are entitled to have the existence or contents of the investigation
not be disclosed if it turns out that violations have not occurred or if further investigation
reveals that other persons are responsible.
C. The Sufficiency of the State's Evidence Should be Evaluated, Not its Accuracy
A trial court should not second-guess the accuracy or the sources of the evidence
presented by the Attorney General: "[T]he question at hearing is not whether the state's
information is true or uncontradicted, but whether, assuming its accuracy, the state has in
its possession sufficient information . . . . " Evans, 963 P.2d at 182 (emphasis in original).
The goal here is to allow the State to conduct an investigation designed to determine
whether the suspected activity has, in fact, taken place. Seeking information pursuant to a
CID is an important means of enabling the State to determine a) if certain conduct has
occurred, b) whether the conduct is illegal, and c) whether an enforcement action should
be initiated.11

11

Other examples of the trial court questioning the accuracy of the State's
information include criticizing the State for not bringing into court for the court's review
a document which had formed the basis for one of the State's conclusions (R. 84:15);
commenting "So after this Bolton who you acknowledge was a competitor - - right there
we've got an issue of credibility I would think - - determines and says and apparently
21

Judge Lewis's insistence on disclosing details of the investigation, in open court,
publicizes confidential aspects of an ongoing investigation in a manner that diminishes
the value and effectiveness of the entire inquiry- and jeopardizes the success of any
resulting enforcement action. In analyzing reasonable cause, the inquiry is not whether
the court believes that illegal conduct is occurring but whether it is reasonable for the
Attorney General to believe that the violations are occurring.12

there's some document which we haven't seen that - - specs on I guess door knobs and
door bars and things like that. . . ." (R. 84:17); and pressing the State: "Do you have
anything to show me that supports what you've just stated?" The State's attorney offered
to put the investigator on the stand to discuss the foundation for the described
information. The court replied: "No. I meant in documents. This must be in some form
of a document isn't it, sir?" (R. 84:21).
12

At the hearing, Judge Lewis appeared influenced also by her disagreement with
the investigative procedure set out in the statute, seeming to prefer that the State use some
other means of gathering information (R. 84:37-39, 41-44). The court opined that "the
A.G.'s office [should], for example, . . . call counsel for Brixen & Christopher and
discuss it with them. Ask to have their clients come in perhaps. But I see nothing here
that leads to a civil investigative demand." (R. 84:16). "And even if it's the correct entity
to talk to, the approach may be totally wrong." (R. 84:17). Towards the end of the
hearing, the court said: "But it's my perception that there are better ways of obtaining
information than the way that we're using this case." (R. 84:36). (See generally R.
84:36-40).
In the end, the court deferred to counsel for Appellee, suggesting that his expertise
be used in crafting a means of sharing information with the State - in a manner other than
that employed by the State. "But Mr. Whitney has been at this longer than we have and
may have some suggestion about how to get the architects' attention so that they do
respond without being hit over the head with a club." (R. 84:41). The judge suggested
considering a court-issued subpoena, but the State's attorney explained that such a
procedure was not provided for by law (R. 84:41-42). Judge Lewis concluded that
legislative action was needed to address this problem (R. 84:43-44).
22

IV.

SUBSTANTIAL OBJECTIVE EVIDENCE WAS SUBMITTED TO
THE TRIAL COURT SUPPORTING THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
BELIEF THAT A VIOLATION IS OCCURRING

When the Attorney General believes she has found a conspiracy in restraint of
trade, she is required to show some objective evidence to support her belief. Evans, 963
P.2d at 183; UTAH CODE ANN. §76-10-917 (7)(b)(ii) (1999). When this test is applied,
without the improper additional factors imposed by Judge Lewis, the analysis should be
straightforward.
A. The Evidence Presented to the Trial Court
In support of its belief of an ongoing conspiracy in the bidding and sale of door
hardware, the State presented, or proffered, to the trial court substantial facts and
evidence. This evidence, in the form of an affidavit of the State's investigator, a copy of
DFCM's contract governing the conduct of architects, and information proffered at the
hearing demonstrated the following:
Examination of several bidding specifications showed a bias toward a particular
manufacturer's products, and that the specifications limited the ability of distributors to
bid or supply door hardware products from other manufacturers (R. 31, 35-3, 38-39; 84:7,
12,17,19,25,30,32).
Architects performing work on state buildings are contractually required to get
permission from the public entity before using any consultants to assist in preparing
specifications and are expressly prohibited from using "sales" or "agent" consultants (R.
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58, 84:23-24).13 Despite this requirement, building owners generally did not know of, or
request, the bias toward this manufacturer or the foreclosure of other bidders (R. 35, 38;
84:7, 18, 25). The CID sought to determine whether Brixen used outside consultants
without notifying the public entities and the extent to which Brixen's bid specifications
were prepared by manufacturers's consultants (R. 4-9; 84:23-24).
The specification bias sometimes also required the use of only certain high-margin,
authorized distributors of this manufacturer (R. 39). Distributors of competing products
were either unable to bid, or had significantly higher burdens in bidding, products from
other manufacturers (R. 35-37; 84:14-15, 17).
Many Utah architects use outside spec writers (R. 34; 84:20, 24-25, 33-34). There
are no independent specification writers in Utah; if an architect does not want to write - or
is not capable of writing - the specifications herself, the only available specification

13

The contractual prohibition reads:

12.2 CONSULTANTS
12.2.1 NOT USE "SALES" OR "AGENT" CONSULTANTS.
The Architect agrees not to use "sales" or "agent" consultants. Said
Consultants are not to benefit financially either directly or indirectly from
the sale or use of any product on or in the Project.
12.2.2 CONSULTANT QUALIFICATIONS. All Consultants
must be licensed for the professional practice used on Ihe Project and be
approved, in advance, by the Owner in the Project.
(R. 58; 84:23-24).
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writers are affiliated with a manufacturer or distributor (R. 34; 84:13, 19-20, 24, 30-31).
The national manufacturer being investigated offers free specification-writing
services to architects and employs two persons whose only tasks are to write door
hardware specifications for architects - for free (R. 34; 84:19, 25-26, 32-33). Many
architectural firms doing work on public buildings in Utah appear to use specification
writers affiliated exclusively with this national manufacturer (R. 34-35, 38; 84:20, 25-26).
When a distributor of this manufacturer writes specifications limited to that
manufacturer's brands, and wins the bid, the distributor is paid a bonus by the
manufacturer (R. 37). This manufacturer varies its wholesale price to distributors
depending on whether specifications for particular projects are limited to that
manufacturer's products (R. 36). When door hardware specifications are written to
require use of this national manufacturer's products, the wholesale price to the
distributors is as much as 40% higher than for a bid open to products of other
manufacturers (R. 36-37; 84:19-21, 25-26). Public entities, whose buildings are subject
to this limitation, pay higher prices for door hardware than would be the case in the
absence of these restraints (R. 38-39; 84:20-21, 25-26, 30).
Brixen & Christopher Architects, P.C. performs architectural work on newbuilding construction for the State of Utah (R. 40; 84:24-25). The State believed, but was
not certain, that Brixen used free specification writing services from this manufacturer (R.
84:26).
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B. Evidence is to be Considered as a Whole
"[Reasonable cause is determined by combining all of the evidence and then
determining whether, taken as a whole, there is reasonable cause to believe that the Utah
Antitrust Act has been violated." Evans, 963 P.2d at 184. The Evans court, analyzing an
investigator's affidavit and the articles of incorporation for one of the entities, determined
not only that this "evidence" was adequate, but that the trial court "clearly erred" in
dismissing the CIDs issued in that investigation. Id.
Together, the evidence presented to the trial court here shows agreements between
architects and this manufacturer where the agreements reduce competition for supplying
door hardware to public buildings. Public entities victimized by this scheme overpay by
as much as 40% for door hardware. Architects violate contractual conditions imposed by
DFCM and harm their public agency clients when participating in this scheme.
Judge Lewis's failure to enforce the CID issued to Brixen & Christopher, in light
of the totality of this "objective evidence," was error. Taken as a whole, this evidence
demonstrates that the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that an antitrust
violation is occurring.
CONCLUSION
The duty of the trial court is to determine whether the Attorney General has a
reasonable basis to support her belief that the law is being violated. Judge Lewis's
inclusion of additional factors was erroneous. When the proper standard is applied, the
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Attorney General demonstrated reasonable cause to conduct this investigation and to
enforce this CID.
The trial court's order of dismissal should be reversed and an order entered
enforcing the CID issued to Appellee.
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION
Because of the importance of the issue presented by this appeal, the State requests
this Court to set the matter for oral argument and to issue a published opinion.

RESPECTFULLY submitted on^^September, 2000.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

WAYNE KLEIN
Assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDUM A

UNITED STATES CODE
ANNOTATED
TITLE 15
COMMERCE AND TRADE

§

1.

Trusts, etc., in restraint of trade illegal; penalty

Every contract, combination m the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal.
Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed
guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by
fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other
person, $350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or
by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.

S 2.

Monopolizing trade a felony; penalty

Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on
conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding
$10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $350,000, or by
imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.

Ch. 2

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

§ 57B-2.

15 § 5 7 b - 2

Confidentiality

(f) Exemption from disclosure
Any material which is received by the Commission in any investigation, a purpose of which is to determine whether any person may
have violated any provision of the laws administered by the Commission, and which is provided pursuant to any compulsory process
under this subchapter or which is provided voluntarily in place of
such compulsory process shall be exempt from disclosure under
section 552 of Title 5.

Art. XII, § 1

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

ARTICLE XII
CORPORATIONS

Sec, 20. [Trusts and combinations prohibited.]
Any combination by individuals, corporations, or associations, having for its
object or effect the controlling of the price of any products of the soil, or of any
article of manufacture or commerce, or the cost of exchange or transportation,
is prohibited, and hereby declared unlawful, and against public policy. The
Legislature shall pass laws for the enforcement of this section by adequate
penalties, and in case of incorporated companies, if necessary for that purpose,
it may declare a forfeiture of their franchise.
History: Const. 1896.

ACCESS TO RECORDS
63-2-201. Right to inspect records and receive copies of
records.

(5) (a) A governmental entity may not disclose a record that is private,
controlled, or protected to any person except as provided in Subsection
(5)(b), Section 63-2-202, or Section 63-2-206.
(b) A governmental entity may disclose records that are private under
Subsection 63-2-302(2) or protected under Section 63-2-304 to persons
other than those specified in Section 63-2-202 or 63-2-206 if the head of a
governmental entity, or a designee, determines that there is no interest in
restricting access to the record, or that the interests favoring access
outweighs the interest favoring restriction of access.

63-2-304. Protected records.
The following records are protected if properly classified by a governmental
entity:

(4) records the disclosure of which could cause commercial injury to, or
confer a competitive advantage upon a potential or actual competitor of, a
commercial project entity as defined in Subsection 11-13-3(3);

(9) records created or maintained for civil, criminal, or administrative
enforcement purposes or audit purposes, or for discipline, licensing,
certification, or registration purposes, if release of the records:
(a) reasonably could be expected to interfere with investigations
undertaken for enforcement, discipline, licensing, certification, or
registration purposes;
(b) reasonably could be expected to interfere with audits, disciplinary, or enforcement proceedings;
(c) would create a danger of depriving a person of a right to a fair
trial or impartial hearing;
(d) reasonably could be expected to disclose the identity of a source
who is not generally known outside of government and, in the case of
a record compiled in the course of an investigation, disclose information furnished by a source not generally known outside of government
if disclosure would compromise the source; or
(e) reasonably could be expected to disclose investigative or audit
techniques, procedures, policies, or orders not generally known outside of government if disclosure would interfere with enforcement or
audit efforts;

(16) records prepared by or on behalf of a governmental entity solely in
anticipation of litigation that are not available under the rules of discov^(17) records disclosing an attorney's work product, including the mental
impressions or legal theories of an attorney or other representative ol a
governmental entity concerning litigation;

76-10-912. Legislative findings — Purpose of act.
The Legislature finds and determines that competition is fundamental to the
free market system and that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces
will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the
highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same time
providing an environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic,
political and social institutions.
The purpose of this act is, therefore, to encourage free and open competition
in the interest of the general welfare and economy of this state by prohibiting
monopolistic and unfair trade practices, combinations and conspiracies in
restraint of trade or commerce and by providing adequate penalties for the
enforcement of its provisions.

76-10-914. Illegal anticompetitive activities.
(1) Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce is declared to be illegal.
(2) It shall be unlawful for any person to monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons to
monopolize, any part of trade or commerce.

76-10-917. Civil antitrust investigations — Demand for
production of documents and responses to written interrogatories — Oral examination — Judicial order for compliance — Confidentiality —
Subpoenas precluded.
(1) When the attorney general has reasonable cause to believe that any
person may be in possession, custody, or control of any information relevant to
a civil antitrust investigation, he may, prior to the commencement of a civil
action thereon, issue and cause to be served upon that person a written civil
investigative demand requesting that person to:
(a) produce the documentary material for inspection, copying, or reproduction by the state where the documents are located or produced;
(b) give oral testimony under oath, concerning the subject of the
investigation;
(c) respond to written interrogatories; or
(d) furnish any combination of these.
(2) (a) Each demand shall state:
(i) The nature of the activities under investigation, constituting the
alleged antitrust violation, which may result in a violation of this act
and the applicable provision of law;
(ii) that the recipient is entitled to counsel;
(iii) that the documents, materials, or testimony in response to the
demand may be used in a civil or criminal proceeding;
(iv) that if the recipient does not comply with the demand the Office
of the Attorney General may compel compliance by appearance, upon
reasonable notice to the recipient, before the district court in the
judicial district wherein the recipient resides or does business and
only upon a showing before that district court that the requirements
of Subsection (7) have been met;
(v) that the recipient has the right at any time before the return
date of the demand, or within 30 days, whichever period is shorter, to
seek a court order determining the validity of the demand; and
(vi) that at any time during the proceeding the person may assert
any applicable privilege.
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(b) If the demand is for production of documentary material, it shall
also:
(i) describe the documentary material to be produced with sufficient definiteness and certainty as to permit the material to be fairly
identified;
(ii) prescribe return dates that provide a reasonable period of time
within which the material demanded may be assembled and made
available for inspection and reproduction; and
(iii) identify the individual at the attorney general's office to whom
the materia] shall be made available.
(c) If the demand is for the giving of oral testimony, it shall also:
(i) prescribe the date, time, and place at which oral testimony shall
be commenced;
(ii) state that a member of the attorney general's office staff shall
conduct the examination; and
(iii) state that the recording or the transcript of such examination
shall be submitted to and maintained by the Office of the Attorney
General.
(d) If the demand is for responses to written interrogatories, it shall
also:
(i) state that each interrogatory shall be answered separately and
fully in writing and under oath, unless the person objects to the
interrogatory, in which event the reasons for objection shall be stated
in lieu of an answer;
(ii) state that the answers are to be signed by the person making
them, and the objections are to be signed by the attorney making
them;
(iii) identify by name and address the individual at the Office of the
Attorney General on whom answers and objections provided under
this Subsection (2)(d) are to be served; and
(iv) prescribe the date on or before which these answers and
objections are to be served on the identified individual.
(3) The civil investigative demand may be served upon any person who is
subject to the jurisdiction of any Utah court and shall be served upon the
person in the manner provided for service of a subpoena.
(4) (a) The documents submitted in response to a demand served under this
section shall be accompanied by an affidavit, in the form the demand
designates, by the person, if a natural person, to whom the demand is
directed or, if not a natural person, by a person having knowledge of the
facts and circumstances relating to the production.
(b) The affidavit shall state that all of the documentary material
required by the demand and in the possession, custody, or control of the
person to whom the demand is directed has in good faith been produced
and made available to the Office of the Attorney General.
(c) The affidavit shall identify any demanded documents that are not
produced and state the reason why each document was not produced.
(5) (a) The examination of any person pursuant to a demand for oral
testimony served under this section shall be taken before an officer
authorized to administer oaths or affirmations by the laws of the United
States or of the place where the examination is held. The officer before
whom the testimony is to be taken shall put the witness on oath or
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affirmation and shall personally, or by someone acting under his direction
and in his presence, record the testimony of the witness. If the testimony
is taken stenographically, it shall be transcribed and the officer before
whom the testimony is taken shall promptly transmit the transcript of the
testimony to the Office of the Attorney General.
(b) When taking oral testimony, all persons other than personnel from
the attorney general's office, the witness, counsel for the witness, and the
officer before whom the testimony is to be taken shall be excluded from the
place where the examination is held.
(c) The oral testimony of any person taken pursuant to a demand served
under this section shall be taken in the county where the person resides or
transacts business or in any other place agreed upon by the attorney
general and the person.
(d) When testimony is fully transcribed, the transcript shall be certified
by the officer before whom the testimony was taken and submitted to the
witness for examination and signing, in accordance with Rule 30(e) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. A copy of the deposition shall be furnished
free of charge to each witness upon his request.
(e) Any change in testimony recorded by nonstenographic means shall
be made in the manner provided in Rule 30 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure for changing deposition testimony recorded by nonstenographic
means.
(f) Any person compelled to appear under a demand for oral testimony
under this section may be accompanied, represented, and advised by
counsel. Counsel may advise the person, in confidence, either upon the
request of the person or upon counsel's own initiative, with respect to any
question asked of the person. The person or counsel may object on the
record to any question, in whole or in part, and shall briefly state for the
record the reason for the objection. An objection may properly be made,
received, and entered upon the record when it is claimed that the person
is entitled to refuse to answer the question on grounds of any constitutional or other legal right or privilege, including the privilege against
self-incrimination. If the person refuses to answer any question, the
attorney general may petition the district court for an order compelling the
person to answer the question.
(g) If any person compelled to appear under a demand for oral testimony or other information pursuant to this section refuses to answer any
questions or produce information on grounds of the privilege against
self-incrimination, the testimony of that person may be compelled as in
criminal cases.
(h) Any person appearing for oral examination pursuant to a demand
served under this section is entitled to the same fees and mileage which
are paid to witnesses in the district courts of the state of Utah. Witness
fees and expenses shall be tendered and paid as in any civil action.
(6) The providing of any testimony, documents, or objects in response to a
civil investigative demand issued pursuant to the provisions of this act shall be
considered part of an official proceeding as defined in Section 76-8-501.
(7) (a) If a person fails to comply with the demand served upon him under
this section, the attorney general may file in the district court of the county
in which the person resides, is found, or does business, a petition for an
order compelling compliance with the demand. Notice of hearing of the
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petition and a copy of the petition shall be served upon the person, who
may appear in opposition to the petition. If the court finds that the demand
is proper, that there is reasonable cause to believe there has been a
violation of this act, and that the information sought or document or object
demanded is relevant to the violation, it shall order the person to comply
with the demand, subject to modifications the court may prescribe.
(b) (i) At any time before the return date specified in a demand or
within 30 days after the demand has been served, whichever period is
shorter, the person who has been served may file a petition for an
order modifying or setting aside the demand. This petition shall be
filed in the district court in the county of the person's residence,
principal office, or place of business, or in the district court in Salt
Lake County. The petition shall specify each ground upon which the
petitioner relies in seeking the relief sought. The petition may be
based upon any failure of the demand to comply with the provisions of
this section or upon any constitutional or other legal right or privilege
of the petitioner. The petitioner shall serve notice of hearing of the
petition and a copy of the petition upon the attorney general. The
attorney general may submit an answer to the petition within 30 days
after receipt of the petition.
(ii) After hearing on the petition described in Subsection (7)(b)(i),
and for good cause shown, the court may make any further order in
the proceedings that justice requires to protect the person from
unreasonable annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, burden, or
expense. At any hearing pursuant to this section it is the attorney
general's burden to establish that the demand is proper, that there is
reasonable cause to believe that there has been a violation of this act,
and that the information sought or document or object demanded is
relevant to the violation.
(8) (a) Any procedure, testimony taken, or material produced under this
section shall be kept confidential by the attorney general unless confidentiality is waived in writing by the person who has testified, or produced
documents or objects.
flt>) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, the attorney
general may disclose testimony or documents obtained under this section,
without either the consent of the person from whom it was received or the
person being investigated, to:
(i) any grand jury; and
(ii) officers and employees of federal or state law enforcement
agencies, provided the person from whom the information, documents, or objects were obtained is notified 20 days prior to disclosure,
and the federal or state law enforcement agency certifies that the
information will be:
(A) maintained in confidence, as required by Subsection (8)(a);
and
(B) used only for official law enforcement purposes.
(9) Use of a civil investigative demand under this action precludes the
invocation by the attorney general of Section 77-22-2.

76-10-920. Fine and imprisonment for violation — Certain vertical agreements excluded — Nolo contendere.
(1) (a) Any person who violates Section 76-10-914 by price fixing, bid
rigging, agreeing among competitors to divide customers or territories, or
by engaging in a group boycott with specific intent of eliminating competition shall be punished, notwithstanding Sections 76-3-301 and 76-3-302:
(i) if an individual, by a fine not to exceed $100,000 or by imprisonment for an indeterminate time not to exceed three years, or both;
or
(ii) if by a person other than an individual, a fine not to exceed
$500,000.
(b) Subsection (a) may not be construed to include vertical agreements
between a manufacturer, its distributors, or their subdistributors dividing
customers and territories solely involving the manufacturer's commodity
or service where the manufacturer distributes its commodity or service
both directly and through distributors or subdistributors in competition
with itself.
(2) A defendant may plead nolo contendere to a charge brought under this
title but only with the consent of the court. Such a plea shall be accepted by the
court only after due consideration of the views of the parties and the interest
of the public in the effective administration of justice.

ADDENDUM B

R. WAYNE KLEIN #3819
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM #1231
Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South.. 5* Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 366-0310
TO:

Brixen & Christopher
Architects PC
252 South 200 East
Salt Lake City UT 84111

CIVIL INVESTIGATIVE DEMAND
INTERROGATORIES
No. 2000-7-265

I. CIVIL INVESTIGATIVE DEMAND
The Attorney Genera] is conducting a civil investigation into possible violations of the
Utah antitrust laws. Pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §§76-10-916 and 76-10-917,
the Attorney General has found reasonable cause to conduct the investigation and is issuing this
Civil Investigative Demand.
Brixen & Christopher Architects PC is required to respond to the interrogatories listed in
Exhibit A. Responses to the Interrogatories shall be provided on or before January 31, 2000, to
Wayne Klein. Assistant Attorney General, at 160 East 300 South. Fifth Floor, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84114-0872.
II. NOTICES
As provided by Utah Code Ann. §76-10-917(2), you are notified that:
1

RECEIVED
JAN 04 2000
BRIXEN & CHRISTOPHER
ARCHITECTS

1.

The activities under investigation, constituting alleged violations of §§76-10-914(1) and
(2), are:
A combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade in the creation of door hardware
specifications for public buildings and in the sale of door hardware for installation in
public buildings in Utah.

2.

You are entitled to counsel during all phases of this investigation.

3.

Any documents or materials produced in response to this Civil Investigative Demand
may be used in a civil or criminal proceeding against you or anyone else.

4.

If you do not comply with this Civil Investigative Demand, the Utah Attorney General
may seek appropriate remedies in the District Court compelling compliance with this
Demand upon a showing that the requirements of Utah Code Ann. §76-10-917(7) have
been met.

5.

You have the right at any time before the return date of the Demand, or within 30 days,
whichever period is shorten to seek a court order determining the validity of the Demand.

6.

At any time during the proceeding, you are entitled to assert all privileges, including the
privilege against self-incrimination, if available.

7.

You are a target of this investigation.

8.

Each Interrogatory shall be answered separately and fully in writing, and under oath unless an objection is made. Any objection, and the reasons therefor, must be stated in
lieu of an answer. The answers are to be signed by an officer of the company who is
answering the Interrogatories. Objections are to be signed by the attorney making them.

9.

If you have any questions regarding this CID, you may contact Del Mortensen,
investigator at the Utah Attorney General's Office at (801) 366-0310.
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m- ISSUANCE
DATED this 7 ~~cfay of January', 2000
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General of Utah
R. WAYNE KLEIN
Assistant Attorney General
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EXHIBIT A
This exhibit consists of Interrogatories to which responses are to be provided in
accordance with the Civil Investigative Demand.
INTERROGATORS
1,

Has your firm, in the past 5 years, prepared specifications for construction (new or
remodel) of one or more public buildings in Utah? If not, execute the certification
below and return the CID to the address indicated above.

2.

If the answer to Interrogatory No. 1 is yes, identify the project and provide the bid
dates for each publicly-fiinded building project that included door hardware
(hinges, locks, closers, exit devices, etc.) for which your firm prepared
specifications in the past five years. Attach a copy of the door hardware portion
of each such set of specifications. If none of the specifications prepared by your
firm on public buildings have included any components of door hardware, execute
the certification below and return the CID to the address indicated above.

3.

For each publicly-funded building project, that included door hardware
components, identified in Interrogatory No. 2, identify any outside person/entity
used by your firm to prepare, or assist in preparing, each set of door hardware
specifications, describe the role played by that person/entity in preparing the
specifications, and describe that person's/entity's relationship to the firm (e.g.
independent contractor, paid consultant, manufacturer's representative, product
distributor, etc.).

4.

Describe any compensation your firm paid, or any other agreement your firm had,
4

with each person/entity identified in Interrogator}7 No. 3, for each public project.
For each publicly-funded project, that included door hardware components,
identified under Intenogatory No. 2, describe any directions or requirements your
fiim received from the building owner and/or general contractor of that project
pertaining to door hardware preferences, performance criteria, or the necessary
minimum qualifications of door hardware suppliers. Describe the documentation
you have of any such directions or requirements.
For each publicly-funded project for which your firm received outside assistance
in preparing door hardware specifications, describe the extent to which the firm
made any changes to the specifications prepared by the outside person/entity.
Describe the documentation you have of any such changes.
Describe any contact or discussions between your firm and any person or entity
not affiliated with your firm (excluding any attorneys representing your firm)
relating to the subject of this Civil Investigative Demand up to the date of the
firm's response to this demand.
End of Interrogatories.
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CERTIFICATION

Certification That Firm has Done No Work on Public Buildings in Past Five Years
On behalf of the architectural firm receiving this civil investigative demand, the
undersigned certifies that the firm

:

Ctyeck One Box
D

has prepared no specifications for construction (new or remodel) of one or more
public buildings in Utah during the past five years, as described in Interrogatory
No. 1, or

D

has prepared specifications for public buildings in Utah within the past five years
but none of those specifications have included any components of door hardware
as identified in Interrogatory No. 2,

Signature:
Printed Name:
Title:
Date:

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me on this

day of January, 2000.

NOTARY PUBLIC

6

ADDENDUM C

R. WAYNE KLEIN #3819
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM #1231
Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor
Box 140872
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0872
Telephone: (801) 366-0358
Facsimile: (801) 366-0315
Attorneys for Respondent

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BRIXEN & CHRISTOPHER
ARCHITECTS, P.C. a Utah
Professional Corporation

])
)
]

Petitioner,
vs.

AFFIDAVIT OF
L. DEL MORTENSEN

]

STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent.

STATE OF UTAH

)1

Case No. 00-0900651

)1

Judge Leslie A. Lewis

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

L. DEL MORTENSEN, being first duly sworn, deposes on his oath and states:

1

Affiant
1.

I am a Special Agent and antitrust investigator for the Utah Attorney General's Office. I
have investigated business or white collar crime for over 24 years. I have been assigned
specifically to investigate antitrust violations for the past 1 lA years. During those 1 lA
years, I have participated in the investigation of several antitrust violations. I have
received specialized training in the investigation of antitrust violations. I am a certified
peace officer for the State of Utah and currently hold the rank of Lieutenant.

2.

1 am the investigator assigned to the investigation at issue in this matter and have
knowledge of the facts and circumstances leading to the issuance of the civil investigative
demands in this matter.

Background of this Investigation
3.

This investigation began in September 1998 and initially revolved around limits placed
on door hardware that could be bid on a building project for a school district in Southern
Utah. Since that time, the investigation has expanded to include bids for publicly-funded
construction projects around the state.

4.

During this investigation, I have interviewed over twenty individuals familiar with the
sale of door hardware via bidding for installation in public buildings. The individuals
interviewed include representatives of a major manufacturer of door hardware,
distributors of door hardware, school district officials, architects, and the Utah Division
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of Facilities and Construction Management (DFCM). In addition, I have reviewed
documents received from a Utah college, school districts, and DFCM as well as
documents received from two Salt Lake architectural firms pursuant to Civil Investigative
Demands issued to the architectural firms.
5.

I believe that petitioner's architectural firm might be a party to agreements or
combinations which have the effect of suppressing price competition in the market for the
public bidding of door hardware to be installed in public building projects in Utah. This
belief is based on my experience in investigating antitrust violations and the following
additional information.

Role of Architects in Bids for Construction of Public Buildings
6.

School districts and other owners of public buildings generally select an architectural firm
to design the building to be built. Among other tasks, the architect is responsible for
identifying the door hardware needed for the building, such as door closers, exit devices
(crash bars), and locking devices. The architect is paid to draft specifications to be
included in the construction bid for the public building. The goal of having specifications
drafted and the bidding process is to obtain as much competition as possible for products
meeting the specification. The competition is designed to ensure fairness and low prices
for the public agency.

7.

The owner of the public building relies on the architect to a) have the expertise to draft
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door hardware specifications that will meet the needs of the building owner, b) be
completely objective in the drafting of specifications so no particular manufacturer or
distributor will be favored without a justified reason for the preference, c) not have
improper or undisclosed alliances with interested manufacturers or distributors, and d)
draft specifications that will result in as much competition as possible for the purchase of
door hardware.
8.

It is my understanding that the fees paid to architects for their work on public building
projects in Utah are a percentage of the total cost to construct or remodel the building.
Consequently, the higher the cost of the building, the higher the fee to the architect.
Conversely, if an architect, through its effort, reduces the cost of some components of the
building, the architect's fees will be lower.

9.

In some cases, a building owner may request a certain brand of door hardware because
that brand is already in use in other buildings owned by the entity. However, in many
cases, the public agency does not request that the architect limit the door hardware
specifications to certain brands. In these cases, the building owner relies on the expertise
of the architect to draft specifications that will deliver products that meet the needs of the
agency, at the lowest possible prices.

Spec-Writing Consultants
10.

When the architect is engaged by the public agency to create construction plans and door
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hardware specifications, the architect's fee includes compensation for time to be spent by
the architect to draft door hardware specifications.
11.

Commercial sources, such as "Master Spec" computerized specifications, are available to
architects as they draft specifications for door hardware. In some cases, however, the
building owner may have needs that are not easily adapted from the commercial sources,
or the architect may not feel that she has the expertise (or does not want to spend the
time) to personalize the specifications for the public agency.

12.

In Utah, some architects write their own door hardware specifications. However, a large
portion, and perhaps a majority, of architects for public buildings in Utah engage the
services of outside consultants for assistance in drafting these specifications. The
complexity of door hardware specifications encourages architects to use outside
consultants.

13.

There are no independent door hardware specification writers in Utah. All specification
writers are paid either by manufacturers or by distributors of door hardware. For
example, one of the largest manufacturers of door hardware in the country has engaged
two persons in Utah whose sole task is to assist architects in writing door hardware
specifications. Thus, when an outside specification writer is used, that specification
writer is always affiliated with either a manufacturer or a distributor seeking to sell
certain brands of door hardware.
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14.

As a result, if the affiliated "spec writer" has drafted door hardware specifications that
favor the brand sold by that manufacturer or distributor, it is unlikely that the architect
will change the specifications and is even more unlikely that the building owner will
detect the biased specifications. This result is made more likely by the general practice of
architects not disclosing to building owners when the architect has engaged the services
of outside spec writers.

15.

My investigation has uncovered many public building bids where the door hardware
specifications are written without the option for substitution ("no sub"), so that only
certain products will qualify for the bid. In some of those cases, the building owner has
requested that the limitation be included. However, this does not explain all of the spec
limitations. The investigation conducted to date indicates that a substantial number of
public building projects have included door hardware specifications which a) limited the
brands which would qualify under the bid, b) were not requested by the building owner,
and c) resulted in the public agency paying higher prices than would have been the case
otherwise.

16.

While these brand-specific specifications may include the phrase "or equal," other brands
are at a distinct disadvantage in getting their products approved for the bid. Even if
another brand is of equivalent or superior quality, the manufacturer or distributor of that
brand must take the time and effort to prove, to the satisfaction of the architect, that the
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product is of equivalent quality. This requires effort and expense not required of the
brand which already is specified in the specifications. Finally, in some cases, the space of
time between the issuance of a bid and the time when bid responses are due does not
allow an "or equal" brand to get its product qualified and prepare a bid. Thus, the "or
equal" designation puts any competing brands at a significant disadvantage in competing
for a bid whose specifications already identify only one brand.
Manufacturer and Distributor Involvement in Specification Writing
17.

A large manufacturer of popular door hardware appears to have created a sophisticated
system for increasing the prices being paid by public agencies and for making it
extremely difficult for other brands to be included in bids for public buildings. This
manufacturer provides door hardware to its three Utah distributors according to a variable
wholesale price which is set at the discretion of the manufacturer. If the door hardware is
to be installed in a project for which bids have been requested, the three distributors can
all buy the products from the manufacturer at that same wholesale price. If those bid
specifications are limited so that only the products of that manufacturer qualify, the
distributors receive no discount, and may purchase the door hardware at that wholesale
price. If, however, the bid specifications are written in a way that more than one brand
can qualify to provide door hardware, either by the use of performance specifications or
because more than one brand is listed, the manufacturer will grant to its distributors
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significant discounts from that wholesale price. This discount permits the distributors to
offer the door hardware to contractors bidding on Utah public buildings at a price
significantly below the normal wholesale price. The discount by the manufacturer to the
distributors may be 30-40% below the regular wholesale price. The manufacturer's
wholesale discounts result in a lower price for the public agency.
18.

Competing brands are significantly hampered in their ability to compete for door
hardware bids. Indeed, if the door hardware specifications are limited to one brand (nosub), competitors cannot even qualify to bid.

19.

In addition to the manufacturer, Utah distributors of that brand also may offer spec
writing services to architects. Those spec writing services also are offered to architects
for free. The distributor covers the cost of writing door hardware specifications not only
from the increased chances that his product will be chosen for the bid, but also by
compensation from the manufacturer. This manufacturer has a policy of paying a bonus
to a distributor that a) writes a specification that permits only that brand to qualify and b)
actually wins the bid to supply that product. This bonus can be used to offset the costs of
offering spec writing services and to reward the distributor for getting that product
placed. The manufacturer can afford to pay bonuses in cases such as this because its
wholesale price is higher than it would be if other brands were permitted to be bid.

20.

The bonus payments the distributor receives from the manufacturer are an incentive for
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the distributor's spec writers to write specifications favorable to this manufacturer's
products.
21.

From my review of door hardware specifications for public projects, it appears that a
clear majority of no-substitution specifications identify products of this manufacturer.
No-substitution specifications for other brands are less common, and to my knowledge
occur only when the building owner requests the limitation.

22.

A bid containing door hardware specifications limited to only one brand still will result in
a certain level of limited competition. If the manufacturer succeeds in getting an architect
to include specifications limited to its brand, there still are three distributors in Utah of
that brand. Those distributors are competing to be selected to provide the door hardware
to contractors building the new edifice. However, that competition only limits the
amount of the markup being charged by the distributors. It does not provide competition
on the wholesale price. Each of those distributors is paying the same "regular" wholesale
price for the product. On the other hand, if other brands are included in the
specifications, the public agency will get competition for the wholesale price as well as
the competition among distributors. A brand-limited specification provides competition
only for one level of the cost of door hardware and excludes competition on other levels.

23.

Because this dominant manufacturer's efforts to capture the door hardware market are
focused on architectural firms and, to a lesser extent, on building maintenance
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representatives, rather than on distributors, the distributors have less ability to deliver low
bid prices. By using strategies which result in architects preparing increasingly restrictive
bid specifications favoring its products, the manufacturer is ensuring its products will be
sold, without discounts, regardless of which distributor wins the bid.
24.

In addition to brand-limited specifications, spec writers from this manufacturer and its
distributors alsofrequentlyinclude requirements that the supplier of door hardware be a
"factory direct" supplier. While this provision is written ostensibly to exclude "fly-bynight" contractors and suppliers, it actually serves to protect the high margins of the
authorized distributors of this manufacturer. This requirement prevents other reputable
contractors from obtaining the door hardware from other sources at prices below those of
the authorized distributors.

Restriction of Trade
25.

It appears that the agreements by which architectural firms permit manufacturers'
representatives to write specifications for door hardware to be included in bids for public
buildings in Utah are restraining trade by preventing other brands from being qualified to
be included in bids by contractors and by preventing other suppliers from competing
against the manufacturer's authorized distributors. These restrictions result in public
agencies paying higher prices for door hardware components of public buildings than
would be the case in the absence of these restraints.
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Relevant Information Possessed by Petitioner
26.

Based on a visit to DFCM, I am aware that Petitioner, Brixen & Christopher, does
perform architectural services on public buildings.

27.

In June 1999,1 sent a questionnaire to a number of architectural firms in the Salt Lake
area, including Petitioner, seeking information to assist us in this investigation. Petitioner
failed to respond to the questionnaire or provide any information voluntarily.

Further, Affiant saith not.
NOTARY PUBLIC
CECILIA D. MILLER
160 East 300 South, 5th Fir.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0872
My Commission Expires

January 9, 2003

STATE OF UTAH

n
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H^CWCJL^/

L. DEL MORTENSE

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 22nd day of February, 2000.

UL.

NOTARY PUBLIC
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APR 1 0 2000

ORIGINAL
THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SLC
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
***

BRIXEN & CHRISTOPHER ARCHITECTS ,j)
PLAINTIFF,!)
vs.

)

STATE OF UTAH,

Case Number:

000900651

)

Defendant.)

***

BEFORE THE HONORABLE LESLIE A. LEWIS
Thursday, March 16, 2000
2:18 P.M.
Transcript of Video Tape Recording of Hearing

Transcribed by:
PAMELA C. SMITH, CSR, RMR
3454 Creek Road
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
File No. 31600ps

1

Appearance of Counsel:

2

For the Plaintiff:

MOYLE & DRAPER
BY: Hardin A. Whitney
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

For the Defendant:

R. WAYNE KLEIN
Assistant Attorney General
160 E. 300 S., 5th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114.
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I

1

THURSDAY, MARCH 16, 2000, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH

2

PROCEEDINGS.

3

THE COURT:

We have two matters that need to be

4

handled this afternoon.

One of them is Brixen vs. State of

5

Utah, 000900651. Mr. Whitney is on —

6

Plaintiff. And counsel could I get you to state your

7

appearance?

8

MR. KLEIN:

9

General on behalf of the State.

10

THE COURT:

here on behalf of the

Yes. Wayne Klein, Assistant Attorney

All right.

Thank you, sir. And we

11

have a motion to set aside that we've got on for hearing and

12

I have generally reviewed the pleadings. I'm happy to hear

13

oral argument with reference to the specifics. And counsel

14

you may proceed.

15

MR. WHITNEY:

Thank you, Your Honor. May it

16

please the court and counsel. As you noticed my name is

17

Hardin Whitney and I'm here representing Brixen & Christopher

18

Architects who is the petitioner in the case.

19

This case arose when the attorney general issued a

20

investigative —

21

claimed that they were investigating a combination or a

22

conspiracy in restraintive trade for the sale of door

23

hardware.

24
25

civil investigative demand in which they

The disquieting thing about the demand is that it
contained two items. The first was that if any materials

3

1 I

produced pursuant to the demand could be used in any future

2

civil or criminal matters involving Brixen & Christopher and

3

the second thing they said was that Brixen & Christopher was

4

a target of the investigation.

5

THE COURT:

6

made Mr. Whitney, approximately.

7

MR. WHITNEY:

And when were these representations

Well, they were made with the

8

demand which our client received on about the sixth or

9

seventh of January of this year.

10

THE COURT:

All right.

11

MR. KLEIN:

If I may —

12

there are written

disclosures contained in the CID.

13

THE COURT:

I'm sorry?

14

MR. KLEIN:

There are written statements,

15

disclosures contained in the civil investigative demand. So

16

it's stated right in the demand.

17

MR. WHITNEY:

What they said in —

the civil

18

investigative demand when it was issued contained these

19

statements that —

20

of thing that

21
22
23

what I call the civil Miranda warning kind

—

THE COURT:

And it was in January as you

indicated?
MR. WHITNEY:

That's right. Now f under the

24

statute under which the civil —

the CID I'm going to refer

25

to it as, was issued, the target of the investigation is

entitled to require the State to show that it has reasonable
cause, and that's in quotes, to believe that a violation of
the act has occurred and that the information sought is
relevant to the claimed violation.
We —

that's why we're here. We elected to file

that procedure and asked that the court —

that the State

show reasonable cause. The statute uses the language that I
just recited but —

and it doesn't say that they have to find

that Brixen & Christopher was in violation but we believe
that that's implicit. It has to have some —

they have to

show some relevant information relating to the claimed
activities of Brixen & Christopher.
THE COURT:
MR. WHITNEY:
THE COURT:

On the target status, right?
Right.

Right.

Have you had any formal discussions,

Mr. Whitney, with the A.G.'s office about this issue?
MR. WHITNEY:

Well, I started out by asking them

if they would furnish us with the affidavit that they've now
furnished us before I filed this.
THE COURT:
MR. WHITNEY:

When did you get the affidavit?
Well, he said as long as I would

respond to the civil investigation demand then he would give
us the affidavit but that was putting the cart before the
horse as far as I was concerned.
THE COURT:

So when did you actually get it?

5

MR. WHITNEY:
proceeded and we filed —

So we actually —

I actually

I can't remember the exact date we

filed this but it was shortly after that.

I've got the date

here.
THE COURT:

It's been some time in coming to

you. Would that be fair to say?
MR. WHITNEY:
THE COURT:

Yes.

I'm sorry.

Say again?

I say it's been some time in getting

to you?
MR. WHITNEY:

The civil investigative demand?

No, they sent that over to me right away, my client did. And
we filed our petition on January 25th. So, we were —

it was

only about three weeks after the initial investigative demand
was filed. And our —

our rationale was that if the affidavit

that they then filed we felt for some reasonable —

give some

reasonable cause for the demand that we would comply. But as
you see from the memorandum that we filed and from our being
here today we don't think that it does show reasonable cause
and we think that it should be dismissed.
THE COURT:

What I'd like to do is certainly

afford you the opportunity to say anything additional that
you wish to at this time but it occurs to me we might be
better in terms of use of our time by letting opposing
counsel respond to that very query, what have they got, and
then let you respond to what they have to say.
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1

Mr. Whitney, does that seem appropriate?

2

MR. WHITNEY:

3

THE COURT:

That's fine, Your Honor.
All right. And that way I won't

4

burden anyone's right to speak that we maybe use more

5

effectively the time. So let's cut to the chase. What have

6

you got?

7

MR. KLEIN:

Our investigation has started with a

8

school district who was building a school building in Iron

9

County. And in that process we found that a large door

10

hardware manufacturer —

11

devices, crash bars and the closures, the ones that

12

automatically close the door when you go through it.

13
14

THE COURT:

this company makes locks, exit

Some school building somewhere in

Utah had some defect, is that correct?

15

MR. KLEIN:

No, no. What happened is the

16

manufacturer of this equipment went to the architect and

17

convinced the architect to write the specs for the new

18

building that would allow only that company's products to

19

qualify.

20

District, did not know about it.

21

limited.

And the building owner, Iron County School
Did not request that it be

22

THE COURT:

Where did you get this data?

23

MR. KLEIN:

We got this from the Iron County

24
25

School District.
THE COURT:

Well who?

Do you have the name of a

1

witness?

Is there an affidavit?

2
3

MR. KLEIN:

I have an affidavit from our

investigator in the file.

4

THE COURT:

I guess where we are taking fairly

5

dramatic steps here, and I can only imagine what one would

6

feel like if one were served with this sort of investigative

7

demand.

8

experience. So I'm going to ask y£>u to be specific. Who told

9

your investigator of this situation?

But it's got to be an awesome and frightening

10
11
12

MR. KLEIN:

May I back up and try and put this

THE COURT:

Of course you can back up. But I am

in context?

13

going to want an answer to the question. You're welcome to

14

approach it any way you wish to.

15

MR. KLEIN:

A little less than two years ago

16

this very issue came up in connection with some investigative

17

demands we had issued in connection with an investigation of

18

some radio stations in Vernal and the judge in the trial

19

court there had quashed our request —

20

investigative demand, and as part of that demand we had

21

supplied an affidavit to the investigator.

our civil

22

THE COURT:

That involved the same entity?

23

MR. KLEIN:

Same entity, no.

24

THE COURT:

So what's the nexus? Why are you

25

bringing that up?

1

MR. KLEIN:

Because the judge quashed our

2

investigative demands and the Utah Supreme Court issued a

3

ruling in 1998 saying that in a —

4

there are really only two questions for the trial court to

5

address. One is whether or not the State has reasonable cause

6

to conduct an investigation to believe that somebody's

7

violating the law. Not that Mr. Whitney's clients are

8

violating the law but somebody's violating the law.

9

an inquiry such as this

And the second question is then whether Mr.

10

Whitney's clients have information that will be relevant to

11

that investigation.

12
13
14

THE COURT:

That doesn't make him a target

involving that information.
MR. KLEIN:

I agree. And we included that

15

language intending to try and do a favor to them to put them

16

on notice that if the information they provided us indicated

17

that they were engaging in the kind of conduct we were

18

investigating, we wanted them to be aware of that before they

19

provided us the information. It does not reflect a judgment

20

on our part that they've engaged in the violation, simply

21

that they are —

22

that if they are engaged in this —

THE COURT:

You mean you send out notice to

23

people and say they're a "target" as a favor to them when

24

they're not a target?

25

MR. KLEIN:

Yes, Your Honor, we do.

THE COURT:

Well, I think that's appalling.

MR. KLEIN:

Okay.

THE COURT:

To suggest to someone in writing

that they are a target of an investigation which puts them in
a completely different legal posture when you know that is
not the case seems inappropriate to me. Can you explain to me
why you do that?
MR. KLEIN:

Yes, Your Honor. We —

we're

following that course because it is the course that must be
used when you're requesting information.

Certainly in a

criminal context for a grand jury witness they must be told
that.
THE COURT:

Oh, wait a minute.

Not unless they

are a target. In a criminal case you never identify someone
as a target of an investigation unless that's exactly what
they are.
MR. KLEIN:

In —

and in the procedure for the

issuance of criminal subpoenas that statute requires you for
issuance of a subpoena you identify whether the person is a
target or is not.

You have to do one or the other.

THE COURT:

With voracity. In other words you

don't just say they're a target if they're not.
MR. KLEIN:

And, Your Honor, I'm happy to

reissue the CID and strike that sentence to do that.
THE COURT:

I'm still not clear on why you did

10

1

it. Could you explain that to me?

2

MR. KLEIN:

I will certainly try. We —

from our

3

point of view we thought that as a firm tries to decide —

as

4

a firm prepares its response that if they recognize that if

5

they —

6

engaged in the type of conduct that we're investigating

7

others for that they may —

8

or may want to carefully consider the information they give

9

us so that they can assert any defenses.

the information they give us indicates they're

may Well want to retain counsel

They may claim some

10

exemption or they may claim privileges so that they're not

11

going to give us information and then later on when we say,

12

well, thank you for the information.

13

given us we are now planning to bring an enforcement action,

14

that they're not going to claim that they were surprised.
THE COURT:

15
16

Do you know what the term target of

an investigation means?
MR. KLEIN:

17
18

Based on what you've

was that they could

—

THE COURT:

19

From our point of view what we meant

No, not from from your point of view

20

but in general do you know what target of an investigation

21

means?

22

MR. KLEIN:

It means that the person is —

23

THE COURT:

Has been honed in on as a suspect.

24

MR. KLEIN:

Is suspected of violating the law.

25

THE COURT:

So instead of sending the letter

11

advising Brixen & Christopher that they had the right to hire
an attorney, that what they said had significance, instead of
doing that you said you are a target or the target of an
investigation. Is that the gist of it?
MR. KLEIN:

Yes. You're a target.

THE COURT:

All right. I see. So, then can you

explain to me why?
MR. KLEIN:

The statute requires that when we

issue a CID we include in that demand a list of notices
warning —

and the statute provides that we must notify them

that they have the right to counsel, that any documents that
they supply to us can be used against them in a civil and
criminal —
THE COURT:

You've already covered the manner in

which that information can be conveyed without putting
someone on notice that they're the target of an investigation
when they're not. Before you were going to tell me what facts
you were relying on provided by whom that led you to issue
the investigative demand.
MR. KLEIN:

Let me make sure that I'm going to

be able to answer the question that Your Honor wants. The
investigation started in Iron County and has now expanded to
be a State wide investigation and it's only the expansion
that has raised the question of Brixen & Christopher's
involvement. So would you like me to explain why we are —

12

1

THE COURT:

I'd like to know who stated to you

2

that Brixen & Christopher was involved and what they stated

3

Brixen & Christopher had done that caused you to conclude

4

that they had engaged in this conduct. In other words why

5

we're here?

6

MR. KLEIN:

Okay. We have interviewed several —

7

excuse me, architectural firms in Salt Lake who had confirmed

8

to us that —

9

to —

we've issued some CID's to —

to about 20 firms

all but this one have provided information and we've

10

interviewed several architectural firms and in two of those

11

meetings they have informed us that there are no independent

12

spec writers in Utah and therefore any architectural firm

13

that uses an outside consultant to write specs, that outside

14

consultant is going to be affiliated with either the

15

manufacturer or a distributor. And as — .

16
17

THE COURT:

So no one has told you that Brixen &

Christopher has done anything wrong.

18

MR. KLEIN:

Correct.

19

THE COURT:

They've just told you —

they being

20

an unidentified group of people. You still haven't given me

21

any names. That when independent specs are given or whatever,

22

that's a bad sign. Is that what it boils down to? Or is there

23

more?

24
25

MR. KLEIN:

There -- there is —

there is a lot

more.

13

THE COURT:

Go ahead.

That's why we're here. So

far I have to tell you, counsel, I'm extremely unimpressed.
MR. KLEIN:

I can tell, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

It seems to me that what we've got

is a situation where we're dragging a company through the
dirt and basically I'm sure the individuals who are
affiliated with the company are! scarred to death and I
haven't heard one thing indicating whether there was any
wrongdoing that would lead you to tell them and conclude that
they're a target.
MR. KLEIN:

The two points that the Supreme

Court said that — •
THE COURT:

No.

MR. KLEIN:

Okay.

THE COURT:

I'm not interested in the case law.

I understand the case law. What I'm interested in —

let me

try again. What I'm interested in, sir, is specifics. Who
told you what that led you to these concerns.
MR. KLEIN:

Representatives of EFT Architects?

THE COURT:

Who?

MR. KLEIN:

May I consult with my investigator?

THE COURT:

Oh, of course. Take whatever time

you need. And I'm going to know —

want to know exactly what

they said about the plaintiff in this action.
MR. KLEIN:

The original complaint was brought

14

1

to our attention by a competing door hardware distributor by

2

the name of Bill Bolton.

3

THE COURT:

4

THE INVESTIGATOR:

5

THE COURT:

6

B-o-u-l-t-o-n?
B-o-l-t-o-n.

All right.

So a competitor called

the A.G.fs office, is that correct?

7

MR. KLEIN:

Yes.

8

THE COURT:

And what did Mr. Bolton have to

MR. KLEIN:

Told us that when he was attempting

9

say?

10
11

to supply some door hardware to Iron County that the specs

—

12

the specifications that had been drafted were drafted in a

13

way to favor only one manufacturer and he could not even get

14

his products qualified for.

15

THE COURT:

How could he make that assessment?

16

MR. KLEIN:

Because the specifications specified

17

—

sorry —

the specifications stated that only products

18

made by this manufacturer were qualified to be bid.

19

THE COURT:

Do you have that document with you?

20

MR. KLEIN:

I do not have it with me.

21

THE COURT:

Have you ever seen it?

22

MR. KLEIN:

Yes.

23

THE COURT:

Why wouldn't you have brought it

MR. KLEIN:

Part of the concern is that we are

24
25

today?

15

reluctant —

or concerned about publicizing the components of

an investigation that we are still hoping to maintain
confidential.
THE COURT:

Counsel, let me explain how I see

MR. KLEIN:

Okay.

THE COURT:

And I understand your concern. But

this.

just as the State has an interest here and their interest is
in gathering data and in keeping this confidential, the
plaintiffs have an interest, too, in being free from improper
notice and orders that to an ordinary citizen are
extraordinarily frightening and inappropriate unless they are
founded on facts. And so far I haven't heard any facts that
would warrant this.
What I have heard is information that would cause
the A.G.'s office, for example, to call counsel for Brixen &
Christopher and discuss it with them. Ask to have their
clients come in perhaps. But I see nothing here that leads to
a civil investigative demand.
And I'm well aware that you haven't had a chance
to say all that you wish to say and I'm going to give you
that opportunity. But we're balancing the rights of the State
and the State is like this huge bus that is just running down
the road as fast as it can go and knocking things out of the
way as it goes. And what we've got on the other side are some

16

1
2

individuals. And that's not exactly equitable.
And the State has a very important responsibility

3

to not abuse its power. I don't know whether it was abused in

4

this case. That's what I'm here to find out. And so I'm aware

5

of what the government is trying to do and it's a laudable

6

objective but it may be the wrong, quote, target. And even if

7

it's the correct entity to talk Ito, the approach may be

8

totally wrong.

9

So after this Bolton who you acknowledge was a

10

competitor —

right there we've got an issue of credibility

11

I would think —

12

some document which we haven't seen that —

13

door knobs and door bars and things like that were created in

14

a manner to only allow equipment made by Brixen &

15

Christopher, is that the idea?

determines and says and apparently there's

16

MR. KLEIN:

17

& Christopher is the architect.

18

certain manufacturer.

19

THE COURT:

20

Brixen & Christopher?

21

MR. KLEIN:

specs on I guess

No, there is a manufacturer.

Brixen

There's equipment made by a

What does that have to do with

As we talked to the Iron County

22

School District they told us —

they provided us with copies

23

of the specifications and we asked them, showed them the

24

specification.

25

company, this manufacturer.

Said it's written only for products of this
Is that something that you

17

1

requested the architect to specify only that manufacturer or

2

was that something the architect did?

3

told —

4

made by the architect because they relied on the architect to

5

provide them with the specifications. So

6

The school district

purchasing official told us that that was a decision

THE COURT:

All right.

—

Let's assume for the

7

sake of argument that you can prove all that you've just

8

said. And that the architect here, the plaintiff, did specify

9

that certain hardware be used and that it was only made by a

10

certain company. What's wrong with that if it's the best?

11

Where did they do something criminal?

12
13

MR. KLEIN:
investigation.

Number one, this is a civil

This is not a criminal case.

14

THE COURT:

Where did they do something wrong?

15

MR. KLEIN:

If the architect has received

16

benefits from the manufacturer.

17

THE COURT:

18
19

That's what I'm getting at.

Where

is the benefit?
MR. KLEIN:

Okay. The architects are paid a fee

20

by the school district or by the other public entities to

21

prepare the plans for the public building.

22

THE COURT:

Right.

23

MR. KLEIN:

Included among that are plans to

24

create the specifications for the bid and then other duties

25

during the construction.

18

1

THE COURT:

Do you have anything to suggest that

2

they were paid differentially? That they were paid more, for

3

example, because of the recommendation or reference to

4

certain hardware?

5

MR. KLEIN:

No. What —

what our indication is

6

that they're paid a fee and some of that fee is to provide

7

specifications. The architects then go up and get the

8

manufacturer to come in, write the specifications for free.

9

The architect then gets to keep the money that would have

10

spent drafting the specifications.

11

school district specifications that are in favor of one

12

manufacturer implicitly telling the school district that this

13

—

14

and not realizing in many cases in fact we think the

15

architects don't even realize that the manufacturer, if they

16

—

17

favor only his products the prices are 40 percent higher than

18

if the specifications allow other products to be bid.

that we —

They then deliver to a

this is the best thing for the school district

if the manufacturer can get specifications written to

19

THE COURT:

Do you have any information to

20

suggest that an economic benefit was derived by the

21

Plaintiff?

22

MR. KLEIN:

Yes.

23

THE COURT:

What is that information?

24

MR. KLEIN:

If an architect —

25

to do certain tasks of work for —

architect is paid

one of those tasks for

19

1

which they were paid they did not provide the* work, someone

2

else came in representing a manufacturer, did the work for

3

them, the architect received the money, did not do the work

4

and delivered to the school district a product that bent that

5

—

6

higher money.

benefited the manufacturer and cost the school district

7

THE COURT:

Where do you get this information?

8

MR. KLEIN:

We have J— we have interviewed

9

several architects who told us that there are no independent

10

spec writers and if any —

11

consultants to write the specs because door hardware can be

12

complex.

13

THE COURT:

that most everybody uses outside

So that's exactly what these people

14

did, right? They used somebody from outside to write the

15

specs?

16

MR. KLEIN:

Yes.

17

THE COURT:

Okay.

18

MR. KLEIN:

And we've talked to people

19

knowledgeable about this company's practices including some

20

of its distributors who tell us that if the spec is written

21

so that only the —

22

product is allowed then the —

23

to bid to the school is at a normal wholesale price. If on

24

the other hand the spec is written in a way that two or more

25

products will qualify then the wholesale price is as much as

that company's —

that mcinuf acturer' s

the price to the distributor

20

1

4 0 percent less than the normal price.

2

And, so, by —

by having a spec that allows

3

competition the price to the school district can be as much

4

as 4 0 percent lower than what they are paying.

5

THE COURT:

Do you have anything to show me that

6

supports what you've just stated?

7

MR. KLEIN:

I can put my investigator on the

8

stand and he can tell you about the discussions he's had

9

with

10
11

THE COURT:

No.

I meant in documents. This must

be in some form of a document isn't it, sir?

12
13

—

MR. KLEIN:

Yes. Every time the investigator

conducts an interview he makes notes of those interviews.

14

THE COURT:

But you don't have any documents

15

that show this. The specs, for example, on the architectural

16

renderings? You don't have those?

17

MR. KLEIN:

yes, we have specs.

18

We —

19

not brought those forward is we don't want to be identifying

20

certain projects and casting dispersions that anybody

21

involved in that project is acting improperly or is suspected

22

of collusion.

23

we are reluctant —

Yes, we have —

THE COURT:

I mean, part of the reason we've

Do you recognize you've already cast

24

dispersions? That that's why we're here? That Brixen &

25

Christopher is the subject of your dispersions?

21

1

Now perhaps there's enough that you've got that

2

supports this but so far I've heard about a man named Bolton

3

who's a competitor and that's all I've heard and I've seen no

4

document to support what this individual told you. Do you

5

have anything else?

6

MR. KLEIN:

We have filed the affidavit of the

7

investigator describing what he's found but we've not

8

attached to that each of the specifications or summaries of

9

the interviews.

10

THE COURT:

Do you have anything else you'd like

11

to tell me at this point? The investigator was Myron

12

Richardson?

13

MR. KLEIN:

No, Your Honor, the investigator

14

THE COURT:

Who is the investigator?

15

MR. KLEIN:

Del Mortensen.

16

His affidavit's

attached to our answer and memorandum.

17

I would like to say one more thing if I may.

18

THE COURT:

You may say anything you wish.

19

MR. KLEIN:

If I can get Your Honor to turn to

20

—

the affidavit of Mr. Richardson that was

—

21

THE COURT:

I'm looking at it.

22

MR. KLEIN:

By petitioner and on page 15 of the

23

attachment to his affidavit.

24

THE COURT:

Page 15 of his attachment?

25

MR. KLEIN:

Yes.

22

1

THE COURT:

There is no attachment to the

2

affidavit. There are eleven pages that comprise the

3

affidavit.

4

MR. KLEIN:

Eleven pages constitutes the

5

attorney's memorandum and attached to that should be marked

6

affidavit of Richardson.

7
8

THE COURT:

I guess I'm looking at Del

MR. KLEIN:

I'm sorry.

Mortensen.

9
10

the affidavit of Mr. Richardson.

11

THE COURT:

All right.

13

MR. KLEIN:

Page 15.

14

THE COURT:

All right.

15

MR. KLEIN:

This is a —

12

I'd like to go back to

I have that in front of

me.

the contract DFCM has

16

with architects including Brixen & Christopher. At the top of

17

that page we have 12.2. And which says the architect agrees

18

not to use sales or agent consultants especially if they're

19

going to benefit financially either directly or indirectly

20

from the sale or use of any product.

21

The next paragraph also prohibits architects from

22

using any consultants unless prior permission has been

23

obtained from DFCM. Which is Division of Facilities and

24

Construction Management.

25

And because Brixen & Christopher has been engaged

23

1

as an architect, has designed State buildings as well, we

2

believe for school districts if they abuse outside

3

consultants and they've not obtained —

4

from DFCM or the school district, or the consultants they

5

have used have been ones that are affiliated with a

6

manufacturer or distributor, then we have a conflict of

7

interest and that conflict of interest is resulting in higher

8

prices to the school district or to DFCM.

9

THE COURT:

gotten permission

I guess what I'm saying visually is

10

this line, and the line leads from this point to this point

11

and then there's this huge empty area where there is no line

12

and you have no nexus between this point and the terminus

13

which involves Brixen & Christopher. Am I missing something?

14

MR. KLEIN:

The nexus that we have is that to

15

get over that gulf, that gap, is that other architects and

16

distributors and the manufacturer's representatives

17

themselves have told us that —

18

will use outside consultants to —

19

hardware specs. And that there are no independent outside

20

consultants in Utah. So if a firm uses outside consultants

21

they have no choice but to use the ones affiliated with

22

manufacturers or distributors.

that in most cases architects
to write these door

23

In addition DFCM has told us that Brixen &

24

Christopher does a fair amount of work for the State.

25

THE COURT:

So you've got Brixen & Christopher

24

1

working a lot for the State. You've got them using outside

2

consultants. And you've got some competitor who's obviously

3

got at least one good argument, axe to grind, who said the

4

specs that are on their architectural plans are made to allow

5

only a certain type of hardware.

6

gets?

7
8
9
10
11

MR. KLEIN:

Is that about as good as it

No, Your Honor, but I'm not going to

argue with you.
THE COURT:

Well, no.

I want to know. Is there

more information?
MR. KLEIN:

Well, in the case of the complaint

12

by the competitor we went to the school district.

13

at the specifications and saw that they did in fact favor

14

only one product.

15

school district, and asked, is this a limitation that you

16

requested and their answer was no. We then asked the

17

architect whether or not the architect had created it for

—

18

had requested the building owner.

In

19

fact they've used, I believe, an outside consultant.

20

We looked

We went to the owner of the building, the

The architect said no.

We then have talked to all three distributors in

21

Utah, of this manufacturer. We've talked to the sale

—

22

district manager for this manufacturer, to one of the spec

23

writers, one of the employees of this company who does

24

nothing but go out and write specs for architects and they

25

have confirmed for us the —

of how this operates. They

25

provide this free service to architects and confirmed to us
that the price is lower if they succeed in getting
THE COURT:

—

And they have not been used by this

architectural firm? Is that what you're saying?
MR. KLEIN:

These spec writers?

THE COURT:

Yes.

MR. KLEIN:

The spec writer has been used. Well,

we believe this spec writer has 'been used by Brixen &
Christopher.
THE COURT:

Well, have they or have they not? I

mean, I thought your case was predicated upon the fact that
they had not been using independent people to operate it for
free.
MR. KLEIN:

The spec writers I'm talking about

are the ones employed by this manufacturer. They are

—

they're employees of this company whose job it is to write
specs to make sure their company's products are sold. So it's
not an independent one.

It's an outside consultant. I'm

sorry if I misspoke.
THE COURT:
MR. WHITNEY:

Yes, Mr. Whitney.
Your Honor, I'd like to ask Mr.

Klein, this architect that you're talking about in Iron
County, that was not Brixen & Christopher, was it?
MR. KLEIN:

Correct'.

It was not.

THE COURT:

Anything else you'd like to say,

26

1

sir.

2

MR. KLEIN:

No, Your Honor.

3

THE COURT:

All right. Mr. Whitney, I'm happy to

4

hear from you again.

5

MR. WHITNEY:

Well, the first point I wanted to

6

make was that —

Your Honor is right that what they —

what

7

the State is asserting is what they believe to be a course of

8

conduct of architects which they think may lead to abuse.

9

They think that if the architects employ these —

what they

10

refer to as spec writers that it's important that they not do

11

so. I would like to explain to the court, I don't mean to

12

belabor this but specifications are really a technical

13

requirement of a given product.

14

What these advisors do is they provide what's

15

called a schedule. The schedule lists the items that would

16

fill —

17

simplistic way it's as though you needed a faucet for your

18

sink and you went down to the plumbing store and asked the

19

plumbing store what they had to sell you that fit your

20

requirement for your sink.

21

fulfill the specifications.

So it's —

in a

Now that's a over simplistic way but the State, I

22

think, confuses spec writers with schedule writers. And an

23

architect when he writes his own specifications, he then goes

24

to a distributor or somebody that will provide the materials

25

and then he makes up his own mind what he's going to buy from

27

1

those. But there's no inference that can be drawn from the

2

fact that he goes to the distributor and seeks the

3

distributor's assistance in preparing the schedules that he's

4

thereby in collusion with and has engaged in a conspiracy to

5

restrain the trade of the door hardware proceedings.

6

Now, with respect to the particular item here,

7

what Mr. Klein has told you is that the arrangement with the

8

Iron County School District raised a suspicion in the State's

9

mind that there was something going on that was improper.

10

Apparently in that case the manufacturer had advised the

11

architect to use the manufacturer's product. But that doesn't

12

mean that that applies across the board to everybody.

13

And as Your Honor said to Mr. Klein being charged

14

as a target in an investigation without any information to

15

show that there was in fact some kind of a collusive

16

arrangement that Brixen & Christopher entered into is —

17

stretch that I don't think is justified. I don't think the

18

affidavit justifies it. And it is —

19

instances contained in the affidavit and I would hope that

20

you would grant our petition.

is a

there are no specific

21

I would like to say with respect to the paragraphs

22

in the DFCM contract about consultants. The consultants there

23

—

24

consultants must be licensed for the professional practice

25

used on the project and be approved in advance by the owner.

that's on page 15, paragraph 12.2.2 talks about —

says
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What that means, they're talking about structural
consultants, electrical, mechanical, those kinds of people
who are paid by the architect. But then they don't sell the
product that they recommend to the contractor. They are
advising the architect what spes —

what information should

be included in the project manual. So a consultant in the
mind of an architect is a professional person who provides
professional advice.
The sales or agent consultants —

that's a

misnomer and I think that the architects do not use sales or
agent consultants. They go to distributors primarily to get
information about what products are available to meet the
specifications that the architect has written.
Unless you have some questions I think I
THE COURT:

I don't.

—

Thank you, counsel. I

interrupted you with a number of different questions, Mr.
Klein, so I'm going to let you have the last word if you'd
like to speak to any of these issues.
MR. KLEIN:

Well, I want to ask Your Honor, I

mean, I would be inclined to talk about the Supreme Court
decision, what the standard is and argue why we met that
standard.
THE COURT:

You're welcome to do so.

MR. KLEIN:

In Evans versus State, which is 963

P.2d, 177, on page 182 the Supreme Court said, talking about
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whether or not a civil investigative demand should be
enforced, says," Decision is relatively uncomplicated and
does not involve extensive weighing or testing of evidence or
any resolution of conflicts on the evidence. The question at
hearing is not whether the State's information is true or
uncontradicted but whether, assuming its accuracy, the State
has in its possession sufficient information to satisfy the
judge that it is reasonable to believe that there has been a
violation of the act."
Following the page the court says," The statute,
therefore, gives the State broad discretion to investigate
possible antitrust violations while at the same time
protecting the citizens from investigation is not supported
by reasonable cause."
And the affidavit in this case is indeed more

—

in many ways more extensive than the affidavit that was
affirmed by the court as adequate in a prior case.
And Mr. Whitney says that —
does not have —

that the affidavit

have actual objective or specific

information. And it does. Talks about how limits were placed
on a project in southern Utah.

Similar problems have been

found elsewhere in Utah public schools. Priced competition is
being suppressed in Utah for public bidding of door
hardware.

The owner relies on the architects to have

expertise and be objective.

Compensation, that the tendency
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to use outside spec consultants that there are no independent
spec writers, that architects generally
THE COURT:

—

(Inaudible.) Compensation. You keep

saying that but you don't say where you get this information.
Or what the compensation consists of.
MR. KLEIN:

The compensation consists of a set

fee that's paid by the public entity, DFCM or the school
district.
THE COURT:

And what information, if any, do you

have that that occurred in this case.
MR. KLEIN:

We have information from DFCM school

districts that they have hired
THE COURT:

—

No, that's not a person. You're

saying the school talked to you. Who at the school?
MR. KLEIN:

We have interviewed Randy Haslam

who's director of new construction and purchasing for Jordan
School District. We have spoken with Mr. Byfield who is
administrator of the division of —

DFCM, Division of

Facilities and Construction Management for the State. His
attorney Alan Backman.
THE COURT:

And what have they told you about

MR. KLEIN:

That —

the money?
that a set fee is paid to

architects for all of the duties that the architects are to
perform in connection with building a public building.

And a
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1

portion of that fee is to compensate the architect for

2

drafting specifications that will be used in the bid for

3

contractors to then supply door hardware to the public

4

building. And that —

5

school district, or DFCM, to prepare specifications that are

6

going to be —

7

the school district or to the State.

and so the architects are paid by the

yield the best product at the lowest price to

8

THE COURT:

So that's standard procedure?

9

MR. KLEIN:

Yes.

10

THE COURT:

I thought we were talking about some

11

irregularity in government here.

12

MR. KLEIN:

The irregularity is that architects

13

having received that portion of the fee that is for the

14

drafting of specifications related to door hcirdware, take

15

that money and instead have someone else write the

16

specifications for free.

17

provide that service for free and so this is many hours of

18

work that the architects are being paid for, does not have to

19

do, because the manufacturer's rep will come in and do that

20

work for them.

Somebody else will come in and

21

THE COURT:

He's the consultant?

22

MR. KLEIN:

The outside consultant who is

23

employed by the manufacturer. And then the specs end up

24

saying only this manufacturer's products can be used.

25

THE COURT:

But you have nothing to show that
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this assessment or determination by someone other than the
architects who's been brought in to consult yields any
monetary gain to the petitioner.
MR, KLEIN:

We do not allege a monetary gain

over and above the fact he's getting paid for work he doesn't
perform.
THE COURT:

But isn't an architect like an

attorney in that you render a service and sometimes the
service involves consulting with others?
MR. KLEIN:

Yes.

THE COURT:

And so really what you're saying is

not that they were paid in a way that other people aren't
paid, they were paid for time that they were supposed to be
spending when in point of fact they were paying —

being paid

when consultants were being used.
MR. KLEIN:

Correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

And do you have any idea what we're

talking about in terms of hours?
MR. KLEIN:

The —

it takes the —

Roy Smith who

is the spec writer for this manufacturer told us that he
spends dozens of hours on each particular project and that
the only thing he does is provide free spec writing services
for architects. He has no other functions, duties with the
company.
THE COURT:

So many architects use these
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consultants.
MR. KLEIN:

Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

And these spec writers may well have

been free as well?
MR. KLEIN:

Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

And their time may in fact have

inured to the benefit of the project in that it saved the
architect a huge amount of time?
MR. KLEIN:

I guess I would stop short of saying

it inured to the benefit of the project because the architect
is paid a fee and if the architect does not use —

spends

those hours the architect still keeps the money, does not
repay it to the builder.
THE COURT:

But this is your standard practice

from what you just told me.
MR. KLEIN:

It is a very common practice.

THE COURT:

So why are you singling out Brixen &

Christopher.
MR. KLEIN:

They're not —

then I have created

a fundamental misconception to the court.
THE COURT:

You said it's a common practice.

MR. KLEIN:

Yes, I did.

THE COURT:

Many architects do it.

So why have

you singled out Brixen & Christopher?
MR. KLEIN:

We have not. We issued civil
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investigative demands for fairly comprehensive sets of
records from two architectural firms in town.
THE COURT:

Who were they?

MR. KLEIN:

EFT Architects and FFKR Architects.

THE COURT:

All right.

Did you indicate to them

that they were targets?
MR. KLEIN:

Yes, we did.

In addition the investigative demands we sent to
Brixen & Christopher were —

was one of 19 investigative

demands sent to architectural firms at the same time and each
of those had identical language.
THE COURT:

So you sent out 19?

MR. KLEIN:

Yes, we did.

THE COURT:

Of these.

MR. KLEIN:

Yes, we did.

THE COURT:

And you feel this is the best way

for the A.G.'s office to obtain information?
MR. KLEIN:

We —

given what Your Honor has said

we're certainly going to change that practice as of today.
THE COURT:

Well, I'm not the Supreme Court and

you seem to feel that you're on solid ground with reference
to how you're handling it.

And, Mr. Klein, I've got to tell

you that you strike me as a very bright, capable, lawyer who
is concerned about doing the right thing. You obviously have
a couple of investigators who look like they're also very
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1

professional and interested in doing the right thing.

2

don't want to malign anybody. I've always had the greatest

3

respect for the A.G.'s office.

4

So I

But it's my perception that there are better ways

5

of obtaining information than the way that we're using this

6

case.

7

MR. KLEIN:

If I may address thcit, Your Honor.

8

THE COURT:

You may.

9

MR. KLEIN:

In this case in June of 1999 we

10

attempted to get information informally.

11

THE COURT:

How?

12

MR. KLEIN:

We sent a questionnaire to about 25

13

architectural firms in Salt Lake.

Brixen & Christopher was

14

one of those.

15

questionnaire. And indeed we were able to obtain a copy of

16

the letter from the Utah Chapter of the American

17

Architectural Institute, AIA?

And none of those firms responded to the

18

THE COURT:

I think that is AIA.

19

MR. KLEIN:

Advising the architects they should

20

not respond to our questionnaire and thus —

21

have to respond to the questionnaire. But it's what forced us

22

into using the compulsory process.

23
24
25

THE COURT:

and they did not

I can well understand that you are

facing a difficult dilemma in trying to get information.
MR. KLEIN:

We did try informally.
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1

THE COURT:

I understand that. I understand that

2

but my experience has been, for what it's worth, that until

3

the lawyers get involved, lawyers representing the architects

4

for example, I'm not so sure that the architects understand

5

or take seriously the voluntary request for information.

6

Somewhere, counsel, between that which I would

7

call very genteel and appropriate approach that may be

8

ignored and this running someone over with a truck approach

9

and leading them to believe that they're the target of an

10

investigation when in fact they're not, I think there must be

11

some median ground, or I would hope there is, where

12

information can be obtained by you in a way that it's not

13

onerous for you, or unduly onerous for you or your

14

investigators.

15

MR. KLEIN:

Or the architects.

16

THE COURT:

Or for the architects but also

17

allows the architect to a —

18

business not thinking as they go to bed if you'll excuse my

19

language," my God, I'm the target of an investigation.

20

What's going to become of m e . " Can you imagine what someone

21

would feel like if they were subject to that sort of order?

22

a citizen sort of go about their

And I'm not faulting you because I understand why

23

you did what you did and I'm not being critical. What I'm

24

saying is that there needs to be some balancing. There needs

25

to be some method for you to get the data you're entitled to
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get so that the State can operate appropriately when
buildings are constructed. So there isn't price gouging and
there aren't unfair practices.
But my sense is that to say to an individual or an
entity or professional corporation you are the target when
they're not, and that's what you told me that they were not,
and certainly and I don't think you were in ciny way
misrepresenting. I think what you were doing is trying to get
their attention. But I think this is a flaw in the system.
And if this has been the practice in your office, I see the
reasons for it. But I would suggest a modification of
practice.
And I would suggest that what you may wish to do
next, because I am going to grant the motion. And yet I do
understand why the investigation has gone on and why it will
no doubt continue. And I can understand why the investigator
here has a legitimate concern as do you. But I would suggest
that you meet with Mr. Whitney and that you meet with the
other attorneys who represent the individuals, and see what
can be hammered out.
Maybe some kind of agreement can be reached that
they're, quote, not a target, and that with that in mind
they're willing to cooperate and they're willing to make a
disclosure as to what they understand the normal practices
are, and to help you so you can figure out what's what.

So
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1

that whatever has occurred in the past, the future will be a

2

situation in which we can all say it works better than it did

3

thanks to the efforts of the attorney general's office and

4

thanks to the cooperative spirit that the architectural firms

5

and their counsel have taken on.

6
7

That would be my suggestion. Mr. Whitney, do you
have a response to that?

8
9
10

MR. KLEIN:
Honor.

May I make two comments, Your

Two comments if I may on that. First is I'd like to

think we are sensitive to the impacts on

—

11

THE COURT:

Well, I believe you are.

12

MR. KLEIN:

Which is why we try to —

the

13

informal methods of gathering information and, secondly, that

14

we do offer and in fact try to sit down with counsel for the

15

people finding information and finding either ways of

16

providing information we need at the least burden to them.

17

In fact we sat down —

we made the same offer to

18

Mr. Whitney who made —

19

worked out for their firms and Brixen & Christopher decided

20

that was not adequate.

21

THE COURT:

that other attorneys and our office

Well, Mr. Whitney has a

22

responsibility to his client and I'm going to let him speak

23

for himself rather than even attempt to speak for him. But

24

I'm well aware of the act of good faith and I'm well aware

25

you tried every method.

So what I'm saying is I think we
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1

ought to be able to figure out a way here to exchange

2

information and satisfy the concerns of Mr. Whitney's

3

clients. Though my guess is they're scared to death.

4

a fair statement, Mr. Whitney?

5

MR. WHITNEY:

6

THE COURT:

Is that

Yes, it is.
And also what your people and you,

7

sir, are concerned about and that is taking care of your

8

responsibilities to the State. And that is making sure that

9

when buildings are built, schools and other sort of public

10

buildings, that they're built in a cost effective, fair,

11

appropriate manner. We're lucky to have employees who are

12

willing to take on that responsibility.

13

Mr. Whitney, would you be willing

14

MR. KLEIN:

Thank you, Your Honor.

15

THE COURT:

Thank you, Mr. Klein.

16
17

—

To speak to

opposing counsel?
MR. WHITNEY:

I would be happy to cooperate,

18

Your Honor, and I think your procedure is a reasonable

19

approach. And I think that I take Mr. Klein at his word that

20

the procedure may follow that's not going to be pursued in

21

the future, as of today I think he said, but I'm hopeful that

22

we can work something out. I appreciate your

23

THE COURT:

And you may —

—.

you've been at this,

24

Mr. Whitney, and I don't mean this to be degrading of you,

25

Mr. Klein. What I'm saying is, you're youthful.

You're
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youthful in the same way I'm youthful. Old youthful.
But Mr. Whitney has been at this longer than we
have and may have some suggestion about how to get the
architects' attention so that they do respond without being
hit over the head with a club. And that last was just an
effort at humor.
You are a great age but Mr. Whitney, I'm not
offending you am I, Mr. Whitney, by saying you've been at
this long enough that you may have given this some thought?
Mr. Klein certainly has as well and has employed a
number of different methods but we've got to find something
that works. Maybe just a simple subpoena In re Such and Such
Investigation that the court issues an order on, ordering
compliance by way of people appearing to talk and having the
right to bring counsel and being notified that it could be
inculpatory.
But whatever we end up with, a vehicle that gives
the A.G.'s office the strength they need and also protects
folks from this belief that the sky is falling.

I think it's

going to come from putting our heads together and taking the
expertise on both sides and discussing things.
Anything you'd like to add, either one of you
gentlemen?
MR. KLEIN:

I hear what Your Honor is saying and

unfortunately we feel two constraints. One is a constraint

41

that to the extent that someone is unwilling to cooperate
with us we are —

our only choice is the second constraint

which is if we have to use compulsory process the CID process
is the only one permitted by statute.

So it may well be that

Your Honor's comments are good ones and they ought to be
addressed to the legislature.

But under the current statute

that's our choice.
THE COURT:

But don't we have the process of the

central subpoena In re Such and Such Investigation that can
be issued by a court? I used to sign those all the time as
presiding judge.
MR. KLEIN:
that we can use —

Under the antitrust act the only way

any time the attorney general gets

information it's going to be —

there's actually some

specific statute authorizing the State to go out and use
compulsory service and for antitrust investigations this is
the only one permitted.
THE COURT:

Well, obviously it bears some

additional thought and here's of course the other thing. If
you have more data then of course you do have the right to do
what you did in this case. I just don't think you were quite
there.
In other words as I was saying we're here.
here, we're moving along.

We're

Then there's this big hole before

we get to the end. And perhaps, you know, if we had
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1

sufficient time it's just not in the papers that were before

2

me that I saw it could be developed. Perhaps it still can and

3

you may be back before me and I may be signing an order like

4

the one I signed initially on civil investigative demand

5

because there was more information present.

6

But I'd like to think that there would be an

7

alternative available to you beyond that that gives you a

8

little bit more leeway.

9

MR. KLEIN:

I understand, Your Honor.

10

THE COURT:

And I also would like to think that

11

folks are not told they're the target when they're not. At

12

least to me, and maybe I'm thinking in terms of criminal

13

actions, the target of an investigation has a very specific

14

meaning and strikes terror into the hearts of most people.

15

So, it was very nice to have met you. Very nice to

16

see you, Mr. Whitney. I'm going to ask you to do the order if

17

you would, sir.

18

MR. WHITNEY:

19

THE COURT:

I will prepare one, Your Honor.
And I'm going to informally order

20

counsel to put their heads together and take all that legal

21

expertise and come up with some structured plan.

22

And, Mr. Klein, I think your comment about the

23

legislature is a good one and I think perhaps that's one of

24

the things we ought to look at. Not in this session,

25

obviously, but next year. Is getting some kind of rule that
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1

gives you more power, more clout as an order but doesn't

2

restrict you to just one particular avenue of relief.

3

Thank you.

4

MR. KLEIN:

5

MR. WHITNEY:

6

THE COURT:

Thank you.
Thank you for your courtesy.
Nice to see both of you. Nice to see

7

you, counsel. Excellent job on the oral argument and the

8

written pleadings. Counsel, you handled a lot of questions

9

very, very adroitly. Thank you.

10

MR. KLEIN:

Thank you.

11

THE COURT:

All right.

12

(Whereupon, the hearing was held in recess at

13

14 I

Your Honor.

3:20.)
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1
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5
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6

the County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, do hereby certify:

7
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10
11

That I was NOT present at the foregoing court
proceedings;.
That the foregoing record was preserved by
videotape; .
That thereafter, I stenographically recorded the

12

requested portion of the video and translated the same using

13

computer-aided transcription, followed by a proofreading

14

against the video.

15
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17 I
18

That the foregoing pages contain to the best of my
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i
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ADDENDUM E

HARDIN A. WHITNEY (3456)
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C.
City Centre I, Suite 900
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 521-0250

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

ROBERT G. WING (4445)
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
Attorneys for Plaintiff
City Centre I, Suite 900
175 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 524-1000

MAR 2 8 7000
SALT LAKE COUNTX /I
Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BRIXEN & CHRISTOPHER
ARCHITECTS, P.C. a Utah
Professional Corporation,

:
ORDER GRANTING PETITION AND
: DISMISSING CIVIL INVESTIGATIVE
:
DEMAND

Plaintiff,
vs.

:

STATE OF UTAH,
Defendant.

:

Case No. 00-0900651^

:

Judge Leslie A. Lewis

Plaintiff's Petition To Set Aside A Civil Investigative
Demand came on for hearing before the Honorable Leslie A. Lewis on
Thursday, March 16, 2000, at 2:00 p.m.

Plaintiff was represented by

Hardin A. Whitney of the firm of Moyle & Draper, P.C. and Defendant
was represented by R. Wayne Klein, Assistant Attorney General of the
State of Utah.
After hearing the presentations of counsel and based upon
the record herein, the Court being fully advised, it is

ooo°\o^^?\
HEREBY ORDERED:
That Plaintiff's Petition To Set Aside A Civil
Investigative Demand served on Plaintiff is granted as prayed and the
Civil Investigative Demand is dismissed.
DATED this / ^

day of March, 2000.

Leslie A. Lewis, Jucfge
Approved as to form:

pf! Wayne Klein
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